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PROTECTIVE ORDERS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION: STRIKING THE PROPER BALANCE
Complex litigation' has exploded in the products liability arena. 2 Both
the number of cases before the courts and the time necessary to resolve
each case have multiplied.' As a result, plaintiff and defense strategies now
encompass previously uncommon practices.4 In particular, where parties to
product litigation once rarely requested protective orders, the use of con-
fidentiality provisions has become an accepted step in conducting complex
litigation.5 In fact, defense bar literature suggests the use of protective
1. See A.L.I., Preliminary Study of Complex Litigation, March 31, 1987 at 4 [hereinafter
A.L.I., Preliminary Study] (discussing factors relevant to identification of complex litigation).
The American Law Institute study characterizes complex litigation by reference to the nature
of the claim or procedural aspects. Id. The study cites mass tort, antitrust, and patent claims
as examples of claims typically characterized as complex. Id. Procedural aspects of complex
litigation include rfiultiple parties and class or derivative actions. Id. Similarly, the American
College of Trial Lawyers noted that complex litigation may arise in a variety of contexts,
including but not limited to antitrust cases, multidistrict litigation, class actions, common
disaster cases, securities cases, civil or criminal cases with unusual multiplicity or complexity
of issues and cases with a large number of parties. Recommendations of the American College
of Trial Lawyers on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 211 (1981).
The relevant factors for determining whether a case is complex include the type of action and
the nature of discovery requested. Id. However, a formally accepted definition of complex
litigation does not exist. A.L.I., Preliminary Study, supra, at 4.
2. See F. HARE, J. GmBERT & W. REMim, CoNmroEIArL ORDERs § 2.1, at 7 (1988)
(noting major increases in filings, days required for trial and cost); Campbell, The Protective
Order in Products Liability Litigation: Safeguard or Misnomer?, 31 B.C.L. REv. 771, 772
(1990) (noting explosion of complex products liability and mass tort litigation); SENATE ComM.
ON COMMERCE, SCIENCES, AND TRANSPORTATION, PRODUCT LiABmury REFORM ACT S. 1400, S.
Rep. No. 356, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (noting massive increases in product liability litigation
causing inefficiency and increased cost); U.S. DEP'T or COm ERcE, STATnSTCAL AESTRACT OF
rm UNrrED STATES 184 (110th ed. 1990) (noting increase of personal injury product liability
cases pending from 9,118 in 1980 to 32,617 in 1988).
3. See F. HARE, J. GmBERT & W. REMINm, supra note 2, § 2.1, at 7 (noting increases
in number of cases and time required to resolve cases).
4. See Walsh & Weiser, Public Courts, Private Justice (pt. 1), Wash. Post, Oct. 23,
1988, at Al (noting that use of protective orders was relatively uncommon beyond past 15
years).
5. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (noting frequent use of protective orders); Ericson v. Ford Motor Co., 107 F.R.D.
92, 94 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (noting attorneys' propensity to seek protective order as matter of
course); Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation, 69 CoR m L. REv. 1, 1
(1983) (noting that protective orders have become accepted part of complex litigation); Note,
Sealed v. Sealed: A Public Court System Going Secretly Private, 6 J.L. & POL. 381, 382 (1990)
[hereinafter Note, Sealed v. Sealed] (noting trend towards increasing secrecy in complex
litigation); Walsh & Weiser, supra note 4, at Al (noting that broad use of protective orders
in complex product litigation has arisen only in last 15 years).
Protective orders constraining the use of discovery materials, one form of confidentiality
orders, should be distinguished from sealing orders that close the entire judicial record. See
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orders as part of the routine of complex litigation.6 Along with the increas-
ingly frequent use of protective orders, courts and commentators have
concentrated on new restrictions on court discretion to grant protective
orders.
7
Generally, the discovery rules impose no confidentiality requirements
on any party.8 In many cases, however, a protective order modifies the
general rule of unrestrained discovery by limiting counsel's use of discovered
information. 9 Thus, discovery procedures use protective orders to protect
the individual parties from possible adverse consequences of unrestricted
disclosure, though the procedures also promote full disclosure in an effort
to balance the public interest' with the private interest." In the federal
system, for example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (Rule 26) exem-
K. Thomas, Confidentiality Orders and Sealing Orders: Legislative Options, PRoTETIcV &
SECRECY ORDEms 363 (distinguishing between confidentiality order, which relates to discovery,
and sealing order which relates to court records and proceedings); Note, Sealed v. Sealed,
supra, at 383 (characterizing three types of confidentiality orders: protective orders for
discovery, judicial sealing orders for entire record, and confidential settlements). Although
protective orders and sealing orders are closely related, sealing orders involve a much broader
scope in terms of information involved and potential harms to competing interests, and analysis
should separate the two. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982) (noting different
standards for discovery protective orders than-for sealing orders), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
(1983); K. Thomas, supra, at 368 (noting relatively narrow range of information protected by
Rule 26(c) as compared to an equitable sealing order); Note, Sealed v. Sealed, supra, at 392-
93 (noting public's relatively stronger common-law right of access in context of sealing order
than in context of discovery protective order); Note, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When
Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NoTRE D~Am L. REv. 117, 150 (1990) (noting
lower standard for discovery protective order than for sealing order).
6. See Kearney & Tracy, Preventing Non-Party Access to Discovery Materials in
Products Liability Actions: A Defendant's Primer, 1987 DEF. REs. INST. MoNoGRH 40-41
(recommending that counsel seek protective order in every complex case, even where counsel
can make no special claim of confidentiality).
7. See infra notes 221-275 and accompanying text (discussing new restrictions on
protective orders in Texas, Florida, Virginia, and Congress); see also Wash. Post, Public
Courts, Private Justice (pts. 1-4), Oct. 23-26, 1988 at Al (discussing examples of court secrecy
in civil lawsuits).
8. See Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 28 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (noting
general rule that discovery is conducted in public absent compelling reasons to deny access);
F. HARE, J. G.mBERT & W. RnMmn, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 114 (noting that secrecy in
discovery is exception).
9. See Bishop & Stiles, Protecting Confidential & Privileged Information, 2 J. Crw.
LIoATION 163, 164-65 (1990) (discussing use of protective orders to prevent plaintiff's
dissemination of discovery information); supra note 5 and accompanying text (noting pervasive
use of protective orders).
10. See infra notes 176-229 and accompanying text (discussing public interest in protective
orders in terms of safety, settlement, and access).
11. See Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (noting
that discovery is generally open but courts may restrict disclosure to protect parties); Note,
First Amendment Interests in Trade Secrets, Private Materials, and Confidential Information:
The Use of Protective Orders in Defamation Litigation, 69 IowA L. REv. 1011, 1011 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, First Amendment Interests] (noting that purpose of protective orders is to
minimize effects on parties while promoting full disclosure); infra notes 39-164 and accom-
panying text (discussing plaintiff and defendant interests in protective orders).
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plifies this balancing system. 12 While Rule 26(b) adopts a broad scope that
discourages adversarial discovery practices, 13 Rule 26(c) recognizes the need
to prevent discovery from causing embarrassment or prejudice to the par-
ties.14 Protective orders therefore serve as an indispensable procedural device
that represents the interests of the party from whom discovery is sought.' 5
Thus, the general discovery rule represents the plaintiff's interest while the
protective order statute or rule represents the defendant manufacturer's
interest.1
6
In federal courts, Rule 26(c)17 governs the application of protective
orders in civil litigation.8 The replication of the Federal Rules by many
12. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing balance attempted within
Rule 26 between public and private interests).
13. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (promoting broad scope for discovery); 8 C. WMGorr &
A. MuxEa , FEDEmA. PRACTICE & PRocEDu § 2007, at 37-40 (1970) (noting Rule 26(b)'s
unrestricted access to information in discovery).
14. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(c) (allowing court to restrict discovery process to prevent
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense); Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (recognizing policy of full disclosure between parties in discovery);
Campbell, supra note 2, at 777-78 (recognizing need for full disclosure and potential for abuse
arising from policy).
15. See 8 C. Wmaiur & A. MILER, supra note 13, § 2036, at 267 (recognizing adoption
of Rule 26(c) as safeguard for parties and witnesses from whom discovery is sought); Note,
Protective Orders: Sword and Shield in the War of Discovery, 12 AM. J. TRALm ADvoc. 483,
486 (1989) [hereinafter Note, Sword & Shield] (noting that Rule 26(c) is the primary device
that limits otherwise unlimited discovery); see also Recommendations of the American College
of Trial Lawyers on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207 (1981)
(recognizing Rule 26(c) as important safeguard against discovery abuses).
16. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 777-78 (noting need to use Rule 26(c) to balance
plaintiff's need for full disclosure and defendant's need to protect privacy rights); see also
Pope, Quinlan & Duston, Protecting A Client's Secret Data, Nat'l L.J., July 8, 1991, at 15
(noting that courts must balance need to protect trade secrets against discovery needs of each
party); infra notes 41-169 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiff and defendant competing
interests).
17. Rule 26(c) provides in pertinent part:
Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery
is sought, and for good cause shown, the court ... may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense, including one or more of the following:
(1) that the discovery not be had; (2) that the discovery may be had only on specified
terms and conditions, including a designation of the time or place; (3) that the
discovery may be had only by a method of discovery other than that selected by
the party seeking discovery; (4) that certain matters not be inquired into, or that
the scope of the discovery be limited to certain matters; (5) that discovery be
conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court; (6) that a
deposition after being sealed be opened only by order of the court; (7) that a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information not
be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way; (8) that the parties simulta-
neously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be
opened as directed by the court.
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c).
18. Id. Current Rule 26(c) was adopted in the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. FaD. R. Crv. P. 26(c) advisory committee's notes. As part of the 1970
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states, signifying a widespread acceptance by other jurisdictions, has made
Rule 26(c) the model for most protective order statutes and rules.19 Even
when states have applied their own statutes or rules, the courts have looked
to examples of Rule 26(c) application in federal courts for guidance in
determining whether to grant a protective order. 20 Moreover, the similar
policies behind the federal rule often guide court interpretations of state
protective order provisions.2' Principles relevant to discussion of 26(c),
therefore, apply equally to a general discussion of all protective order
statutes.?
Generally, Rule 26(c) allows a court to restrict the dissemination of
discovered material after the moving party has shown good cause.23 Courts
amendments, the protective order provisions of Rules 30(b) were transferred to Rule 26(c) to
make Rule 26(c) applicable to discovery generally. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37, advisory committee
's explanatory statement concerning 1970 amendments of the discovery rules; 8 C. WasoHT &
A. MnLER, supra note 13, § 2035, at 261.
19. See F. JAmEs & G. HAzARD, CiL PROCEDURE § 5.2, at 230 (1985) (noting that most
states have adopted discovery provisions modeled after the federal rules); Note, Sword &
Shield, supra note 15, at 485 (same).
Several states have adopted protective order provisions that are similar to Rule 26(c). See
e.g., ALA. R. Civ. P. 26(c); ALAsKA R. Civ. P. 30(b); Aiz. R. Civ. P. 26(c); ARK. R. Crv.
P. 26(c); CoLo. R. Crv. P. 26(c); CONN. Sup. CT. Cirv. R. § 221; DEL. R. Civ. P. 26(c); FLA.
R. 1.280; GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-26(c); HAw. R. Crv. P. 26(c); IDAHO R. CIrv. P. 26(c); ILL.
Sup. CT. R. 201(c)(1); IND. R.P. 26(c); IowA R. Civ. P. 123; KAN. R. Cirv. P. 60-226(c); KY.
R. Civ. P. 26.03; LA. CODE CIV. PRoC. ANN. art. 1426; ME. R. Civ. P. 26(c); MD. CIR. CT.
R. Civ. P. 2-403, DIST. CT. R. CIrv. P. 3-421(c); MAss. R. CIrv. P. 26(c); MICH. R. Civ. P.
2.302(c); MINN. R. Cirv. P. 26.03; Miss. R. Crv. P. 26(d) ; Mo. R. CIrv. P. 56.01(c); MONT.
R. Civ. P. 26(c); NEB. SuP. CT. DiscovERY R. 26(c); Nay. R. Civ. P. 26(c); N.H. SPER.
CT. ADmiN. R. 35; N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, R. Crv. P. 26(c); N.M. DIST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-
026(C); N.D.R. Crv. P. 26(c); Oaio R. Civ. P. 26(C); OKuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 3226(C);
OR. R. Civ. P. 36(C); PA. R. Civ. P. 4012; R.I. DIsT. CT. Civ. R. 30(b); S.C.R. Civ. P.
26(c); S.D.R. Civ. P. 15-6-26(c); TENN. R. Civ. P. 26.03; UTAH R. Crv. P. 26(c); VT. R. Crv.
P. 26(c); VA. R. Sup. CT. 4:1(c); WAsH. R. SuPER. CT. 26(c); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26(c); Wis.
STAT. § 804.01. Several states, however, have adopted protective order provisions that are not
similar to Rule 26(c). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2019(b), 2025(i), 2030(e), 2031(e), 2032(g),
2033(e), 2034(e) (substantively similar but more detailed than Rule 26(c)); N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L.
& R. § 3103 (Consol. 1970); Tx. R. Civ. P. 166b(5) & 76a; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01
(affecting Virginia rule cited above).
20. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. 1987) (using federal interpretations
of Rule 26(c) to interpret the Texas protective order statute); Madison v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
308 So. 2d 784, 786 (La. 1975) (looking to federal interpretations of Rule 26(c) to guide
interpretation of La. Code Civ. Proc. 1452); 23 AM. JuR. 2D Depositions and Discovery § 84
(1983) (noting that courts interpreting state protective order provisions look to federal courts
for guidance).
21. See 23 AM. JuR. 2D Depositions & Discovery § 84 (1983) (recognizing similar policies
behind state and federal rules).
22. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 29 (1986) (applying principles of
federal rules to state protective order provision); Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 345 (same); F. HARE,
J. GILBERT & W. RaMnm, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 3 (noting that state protective order
provisions are generally equivalent to Rule 26, allowing application of principles behind federal
rule); F. JmaES & G. HAZARD, supra note 19, § 3.22, at 179 (same); Riley & Hoefer, Protective
Orders: Machiavelli Would Be Pleased, TRIAL, November 1984, at 31 (same).
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
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have defined good cause to require that the moving party demonstrate a
clearly defined and very serious injury.24 Further, the burden of persuasion
as to good cause rests with the party seeking the protective order.2Y To
carry the burden of persuasion, the moving party must show a particularized
harm that would arise from unrestricted use of the specific documents. s
The harm of unrestricted disclosure must be significant and may not be
substantiated by conclusory statements. 27 After finding good cause, the court
must then evaluate each of the countervailing concerns to determine whether
the court should use the court's discretion to grant a protective order. s
Because of changes in protective order policy in various legislatures and
courts, the principles behind Rule 26(c) are no longer the exclusive focus
of the protective order analysis.29 Concern by legal observers that the good
cause standard inadequately values plaintiff and public interests has prompted
24. See Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 28 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (requiring
that moving party show that disclosure will work clearly defined and very serious injury in
order to show good cause); Citicorp v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 478 F. Supp. 756, 765 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (recognizing heavy burden of showing that disclosure will work clearly defined and very
serious injury).
25. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting
that party seeking order has burden of persuasion). Conversely, the party resisting an umbrella
protective order bears the burden of challenging the order regarding specific documents. See
Campbell, supra note 2, at 786 (describing umbrella order procedure). With umbrella protective
orders, however, the protected party retains the burden of showing good cause as to the
information once challenged. Id.
26. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (requiring particular
factual demonstration of potential harm); In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 193 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(requiring specific showing that unlimited dissemination would pose concrete threat to defen-
dant's interests); General Dynamics Corp. v. Selb Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 1204, 1212 (8th Cir.
1973) (requiring "particular and specific demonstration of fact"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1162
(1974); 8 C. WuosGr & A. MULER, supra note 13, § 2035, at 264-65 (noting requirement of
particular and specific demonstration of fact); Note, Sword & Shield, supra note 15, at 493
(same).
27. See Anderson, 805 F.2d at 7 (excluding conclusory statements from finding of good
cause); Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1121 (holding broad, unsubstantiated allegations insufficient to
show good cause); 8 C. Wucrr & A. MmLER, supra note 13, § 2035, at 265 (distinguishing
stereotyped and conclusory statements as insufficient for good cause).
28. See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 (W.D.N.Y.
1981) (holding that once good cause has been shown, court should consider countervailing
considerations); Note, Protective Orders and the Use of Discovery Materials Following Seattle
Times, 71 MINN. L. Ray. 171, 192 (1986) (noting need for balancing test involved in good
cause determination). Good cause involves more than just a balancing of the interests: the
courts must consider the countervailing interests only after finding a particularized injury. See
Hooker Chems., 90 F.R.D. at 425 n.4 (arguing that merely a balancing test for good cause
could not ensure broad and liberal treatment for discovery); F. HARE, J. G IBERT & W.
REMINE, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 114 (arguing that good cause involves more than merely
balancing of interests). A balancing of interests must occur when legislatures or courts draft
protective order provisions, however, to ensure that protective orders will protect each parties'
interests. See Herring, Sealing Court Records, Tex. Law., May 21, 1990, at 24 (noting difficulty
of balancing interests in drafting Texas Rule 76a).
29. See infra notes 230-288 (discussing focus of Texas, Virginia, and Florida provisions
and Congressional proposal).
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both new standards and more complex procedures 0 As protective order
provisions become more varied, evaluation of the competing interests of the
parties and the judicial system that are shaping the legislative changes
becomes essential to an understanding of protective orders. Thus, in addition
to the practical requirements,3' Rule 26(c) is the starting point for under-
standing other types of protective order provisions. Protective order provi-
sions now represent a variety of balances by which the courts are to evaluate
the need for confidentiality in discovery. 2 The correct balance must achieve
the proper measure between each of three broad categories of interests:
defendant, plaintiff, and public.
33
The value of the competing interests will depend upon which of two
general types of disclosure the discussion centers: public dissemination or
information sharing.34 Public dissemination without the restriction of a
protective order allows general public access to discovery information.3"
Information sharing, on the other hand, refers to the ability of attorneys
operating under the restrictions of a protective order to give that information
to other attorneys involved in similar litigation. 36 Three degrees of disclosure
therefore exist for purposes of protective order analysis.37 First, no protective
order may exist, meaning that no restrictions on disclosure exist.38 Second,
a protective order may allow information sharing only with attorneys
30. See id. (discussing new Texas, Virginia, and Florida protective order policies and
procedures and Congressional proposal).
31. See supra note 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing practical requirements of
Rule 26(c)).
32. Compare FED R. Cirv. P. 26(c) (requiring good cause) with TEx. R. Crv. P. 76a
(requiring specific, serious and substantial interest to overcome presumption of openness and
risk to public) and VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Supp. 1990) (limiting scope of protective
orders issued for good cause).
33. See infra notes 41-46, 102-114, 170-175 (discussing generally defendant, plaintiff, and
public interests).
34. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (discussing public dissemination versus
information sharing). As an example of the change in value depending on the mechanism
employed, the risk of losing a trade secret will be far less when the manufacturer discloses
the material pursuant to a rule allowing information sharing only among plaintiffs and not
allowing general public disclosure. See Note, Mass Products Liability Litigation: A Proposal
for Dissemination of Discovered Information Covered by a Protective Order, 60 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1137, 1149-50 (1985) [hereinafter Note, A Proposal] (noting protection of defendant's
interest in information through information sharing).
35. See generally Marcus, supra note 5, at 41-46 (discussing information sharing as
alternative to public dissemination). Under information sharing, attorneys involved in similar
litigation receive the information, while public dissemination allows the general public to receive
the information. See id. at 41 (arguing that no basis exists for unrestrained public access,
although basis may exist for access for collateral litigation); see also Campbell, supra note 2,
at 774 (discussing adverse effects of uncontrolled dissemination to public).
36. See MANUAL FOR CoMPLEx LIGATION, SECOND § 21.431 (1985) (discussing advantages
to allowing access to discovery information for parties in related litigation); Note, A Proposal,
supra note 34, at 1137-38 (arguing that sharing of information among similarly situated
plaintiffs can solve expense, delay and injustice in complex litigation).
37. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing three degrees of disclosure).
38. See infra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing public dissemination).
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involved in similar litigation.3 9 Finally, a protective order may create absolute
restrictions on disclosure, meaning that a protective order allows no dissem-
ination beyond the parties themselves. 4°
Because of the defendant's personal and economic interest in the liti-
gation, the defendant in products litigation has the strongest motive for
highly restrictive protective orders.4 1 Discovery is inherently an invasionary
procedure that additional disclosure exacerbates. 42 In resisting discovery,
defendants have asserted a right to privacy that would allow them to be
free of the intrusive aspects of disclosed discovery. 43 The defendant manu-
39. See id. (discussing information sharing).
40. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing general rule of unrestrained
dissemination absent protective order).
41. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 773 (discussing defendant's interest in obtaining
protective order). Despite the defendant's strong interest in obtaining a protective order,
protective orders may protect anyone faced with a discovery request, including plaintiffs or
third parties. See id. (noting possibility that other parties will seek protection from dissemination
of discovery materials).
42. See infra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing discovery versus privacy inter-
ests).
43. See Note, Court-Approved Confidentiality Orders: Why They Are Needed, 57 DE-
FENSE COUNS. J. 89, 89 (1990) [hereinafter, Note, Court-Approved Confidentiality Orders]
(stating that protective orders prevent invasion of privacy in discovery by public, press or
adversaries); Hoenig, Protective Confidentiality Orders, N.Y.L.J., March 5, 1990, at 3 col. I
(stating that protective orders alleviate statutorily allowed invasion of privacy in discovery);
Ostrow, Secrecy Accords in Product Liability Lawsuits Debated, Los Angeles Times, April 26,
1990, at A16, col. I (stating that granting public access to discovery would disrupt constitutional
privacy interests and judicial efficiency); Weiner, Secret Settlements Prevent Discovery Abuse,
Manhattan Lawyer, April 1990, at 13 (noting that while plaintiff has a right to view defendant's
files, the public does not). Thus, the process itself gives rise to a limited invasion of privacy.
Despite claims of privacy, a question exists as to whether a corporation may claim a
legitimate right of privacy. See Anderson, How to Use Protective Orders to Safeguard
Confidential Information, 32 PRAc. LAw. 23, 26 (1986) (noting that the laws of the particular
jurisdiction will determine the extent of corporate privacy rights). The courts generally have
held that corporations do not enjoy the constitutional right of privacy that individuals enjoy.
See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2925 (1989) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that corporation has no right of privacy);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 34 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (stating that corporations have been denied Constitutional right of privacy); United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) (holding that corporations have no
equality with individuals in right of privacy); Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177
S.W.2d 369 (Ct. App. 1944) (noting that right of privacy is designed to protect human beings,
not business interests); Dauer & Fittipaldi, Inc. v. Twenty First Century Communications,
Inc., 349 N.Y. Supp. 2d 736 (App. Div. 1973) (holding that corporation has no legally
protected right of privacy in New York); F. HARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMiNE, supra note 2,
§ 7.9, at 199 (arguing that corporation has no right of privacy); Note, Rule 26(c) Protective
Orders and the First Amendment, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1645, 1663 (1980) (same). But see
Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1022 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (concluding that
corporation has privacy interest in discovery materials not used at trial that is essentially equal
to individual's privacy interest), vacated on reh'g en banc, 737 F.2d 1170 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Note, Protective Orders and Commercial Information-Is Good Cause Good Enough?, 59 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 103, 109-13 (1984) (noting that courts have begun to recognize Constitutional
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facturer has two reasons to support highly restrictive protective orders. 44
First, because the defendant has a clear property interest in trade secrets or
confidential information, the defendant has a legitimate need to protect that
information from public disclosure. 45 Second, the defendant gains strategic
benefits from protective orders.
46
Based on the need to protect trade secrets or other confidential infor-
mation, defendants usually invoke Rule 26(c)(7). 47 To take advantage of
Rule 26(c)(7), the defendant must meet two requirements .4 First, the moving
party must show that the information sought is a trade secret or is confi-
dential information within the scope of Rule 26(c)(7). 49 Second, the moving
corporate right of privacy).
A corporate defendant that asserts a violation of corporate privacy does so on the basis
of a view of discovery as a matter of "legislative grace." See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,
467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (noting that parties obtain information through discovery as a matter
of legislative grace); Hoenig, supra, at 3 (noting that privacy interests are included in broad
purpose of Rule 26(c)) (citing Seattle Times); Bishop & Stiles, supra note 9, at 169 (noting
that information obtained through discovery is a matter of legislative grace, making a protective
order only a limited -infringement on free speech).
44. See infra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (noting information protection and
strategic advantages of protective orders).
45. See United States v. IBM Corp., 82 F.R.D. 183, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that
company has right to protection of confidential information); Note, Anti-Dissemination Orders
in Product Liability Suits, 5 Am. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 507, 510 (1982) [hereinafter, Note, Anti-
Dissemination Orders] (noting that existence of trade secret gives rise to property right that
disclosure destroys); Note, Court-Approved Confidentiality Orders, supra note 43, at 91 (noting
defendant's property interest in trade secret). By definition, disclosure of a trade secret would
cause competitive disadvantage to the party disclosing. Id. Further, the specific exception in
Rule 26(c) for trade secrets or other confidential commercial information demonstrates the
legitimacy of the defendant's claim of proprietary rights. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(c)(7) (allowing
courts to issue protective orders for trade secrets or confidential commercial information).
However, the relative rarity of a trade secret that satisfies the Rule 26 standard makes the
defendant's interest in protective orders a less viable argument in favor of highly restrictive
confidentiality provisions. See Legal Times, Jan. 8, 19Y0, at 28 (noting that the risk of exposing
actual trade secrets in litigation is relatively rare); infra note 51 and accompanying text (noting
difficulty of meeting court-imposed criteria for trade secret protection); see also UNIF. TRADE
SEcRE's ACT (UTSA) § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 437, 438 (1985) (defining trade secret). The UTSA
omits the Restatement of Torts § 757 requirement that the defendant use the trade secret
continuously in business, arguably broadening the criteria for evaluating trade secrets. See
Hoenig, supra note 43, at 3 (noting broader UTSA definition).
46. See infra notes 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing strategic benefits of protective
orders).
47. See 8 C. WRIOHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 2035, at 261 (noting that subsection
(c)(7) is provision that products liability defendants usually employ); Note, A Proposal, supra
note 34, at 1145 (same). Until 1970, Rule 30(b) had allowed protective orders for secret
processes, developments, or research. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 2043, at
300. Confidential information refers to material encompassed by the Rule 26(c)(7) "other
confidential research, development, or commercial information" language. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(c)(7).
48. See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (outlining Rule 26(c)(7) requirements).
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See F. HARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMn , supra note 2, § 6.1,
at 116, § 7.8, at 180 (describing defendant's' burden as showing that documents are trade
secrets); 8 C. WIOHT & A. MILLER, supra note 13, § 2043, at 301 (noting that party resisting
disclosure must show that information is within scope of Rule 26(c).
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party must show that disclosure would cause harm to the party.50
Despite the Rule 26(c)(7) provisions, courts have defined "trade secret"
so narrowly that courts rarely issue protective orders on the basis of a trade
secret.-1 The Restatement of Torts (Restatement) section 757 (section 757)
provides the narrow definition of trade secret that most courts have applied.
5 2
The Restatement requires that the information provide an advantage over
competitors by virtue of the information's secrecy. 3 To determine whether
information rises to the level of a trade secret, section 757 cites six factors
as determinative of whether a trade secret exists: the extent to which the
information is known outside the business; the extent to which the infor-
mation is known within the business; the measures taken to insure secrecy;
the value of the information; the amount of effort or money used to develop
the information; and the difficulty that others would have in properly
acquiring or duplicating the information 4
50. See Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 28 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (requiring
specific examples of competitive harm); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (requiring cognizable harm sufficient to warrant a
protective order); F. HARE, J. GLmBERT & W. REMiNE, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 116, § 7.8, at
180 (de cribing defendant's burden as showing that documents are trade secrets and that
disclosure would cause harm); 8 C. WRiOHT & A. M=nR, supra note 13, § 2043, at 301
(requiring showing of harm by disclosure of information).
51. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 780 (noting difficulty of designating information as
trade secret pursuant to Rule 26(c)(7)); Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1145-46 (same).
52. See Waelde, 94 F.R.D. at 27 (stating that courts have adopted § 757 of the
Restatement of Torts as the criteria to use in evaluating trade secrets); Reliance Ins. Co. v.
Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202-203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); see also Campbell, supra note
2, at 779 (outlining Restatement criteria).
53. RESTATEmEiT oF ToRTs § 757 comment b (1939). The Restatement defines trade
secret as:
any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's
business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors
who do not know or use it.... A trade secret is a process or device for continuous
use in the operation of the business.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b. Section 757 was not included in the second
Restatement because the issue of trade secrets was placed within the area of unfair competition
and trade regulation. R=SATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 1-2 (1977). Nevertheless, courts continue
to cite the 1939 version as the controlling definition for protective order purposes. See United
States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (citing Restatement of Torts §
757).
Alternatively, the Uniform Trade Secrets Act defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:
(i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
(ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.
UTSA § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. at 438.
54. RESTATE ENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b. See Waelde 94 F.R.D. at 28-29 (employing
Restatement factors); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(applying Restatement § 757 factors); United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. at 46 (same).
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The leading case in the area of trade secret protection is United States
v. IBM Corp. ,S5 an antitrust action in which a New York district court
issued a protective order allowing deposed witnesses to designate certain
parts of the deposition as confidential within the meaning of Rule 26(c)(7). 56
The witnesses later requested continuation of the protective order.5 7 In
applying the section 757 factors, the court found that one of the parties
seeking continuation of the order, the Burroughs Corporation, had not
shown that the information had been kept secret within the company and
had not demonstrated that any measures had been taken to insure secrecy.58
Further, the court found that the data was no longer current and questioned
as too speculative the allegations of value.59 Additionally, the court denied
continued protection to a second party, the Honeywell Corporation, because
the data was not current and so disclosure would have little impact on the
corporation's current competitive ability.60 The court relied heavily on the
currency of information, finding that information three to fifteen years old
presents only speculative issues of competitive value. 6' Thus, the value of
55. 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
56. United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27 (E.D. Mich. 1981) is a leading case
applying section 757 to the products liability context. In Waelde, the defendant drug company
moved for a Rule 26(c)(7) protective order to prevent disclosure of product information
contained in a Food and Drug Administration New Drug Application file. Id. at 17-18. Citing
IBM, the Michigan district court applied the section 757 standards. Id. at 28-29. Because the
defendant had asserted merely that the file contained trade secrets without making particularized
showings that the trade secrets did exist, the court found that the defendant had not met the
burdens of Rule 26(c)(7) and denied the motion. Id. at 29-30. The court also noted that the
plaintiff was not a competitor. Id. If the plaintiff had been a competitor, the likelihood of
competitive injury would have increased and the court would have been more likely to grant
the protective order. Id. Waelde thus demonstrates the importance of the identity of the party
seeking disclosure and the role which that party plays in proving competitive injury. Id. See
American Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that courts
generally find disclosure to competitor more harmful than disclosure to noncompetitor); Parsons
v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (rejecting justification for
order on basis of plaintiff's intent to collaborate among other litigants, as long as discovery
is not sought solely for that purpose); Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405,
410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (requiring evidence of bad faith on part of plaintiff before a court will
limit use of discovery); F. HARE, J. GLBERT & W. RIlnMu, supra note 2, § 7.8, at 175
(noting importance of whether party seeking information is competitor); Campbell, supra note
2, at 780 (noting that courts usually find that disclosure to competitor is more harmful than
disclosure to noncompetitor).
57. IBM, 67 F.R.D. at 42-43.
58. Id. at 47. The court also rejected continued protection for another witness, Dr.
Sidney Fernbach, because his services were commercial in character and he had not represented
those services as being provided on a confidential basis to the company. Id.
59. Id. at 47-48.
60. Id. at 48-49.
61. Id. at 47-48. Courts have held that the age of the information involved is significant
in determining whether to issue a protective order. See Deford v. Schmid Prods. Co., 120
F.R.D. 648, 653-54 (D. Md. 1987) (holding that staleness of information must be overcome
by specific showing of present harm); Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21,
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the information, the fourth Restatement factor, usually will be of paramount
concern in a court's application of Rule 26(c)(7), particularly in instances
where the staleness of the information affects the value.
62
Because of the difficulty of characterizing information as a trade secret,
parties requesting protective orders often rely on the confidential information
provision of Rule 26(c)(7). 63 Unlike the strict test for trade secret claims,
the confidential information exception does not require a stringent appli-
cation of a section 757-type criteria.64 In fact, courts often define confidential
information in terms of the harm alone, without reference to the nature of
the discovered information. 6 However, the confidential information stan-
dard of Rule 26(c)(7) requires both a showing that the information is
23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (finding that year-old information did not warrant Rule 26(c)(7) protection
where information could not harm defendant competitively); United States v. Lever Bros. Co.,
193 F. Supp. 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (denying protection for company financial information
three to eight years old), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 932 (1962).
62. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 781-82 (noting importance of staleness of information
in proving harm of disclosure); supra note 61 (noting examples of cases in which staleness as
affecting value of information was major concern).
63. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 780-81 (noting less restrictive standard for confidential
information than for trade secrets under Rule 26(c)(7)); Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at
1145-46 (noting that defendants requesting protective order usually employ confidential infor-
mation provision of Rule 26(c)(7)).
64. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 780-81 (noting that information that does not rise to
the level of trade secret may be entitled to protection as confidential information). Some
confusion exists as to the test that courts should apply to the confidential information provision
of Rule 26(c)(7). Compare Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 725 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (setting up new criteria for confidential information when defendant had admitted that
information was not. trade secret) and Campbell, supra note 2, at 780-81 (differentiating
between test for trade secrets and test for confidential information) with American Standard
Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (using the terms "trade secret" and
"confidential information" interchangeably) and F. HARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMINE, supra
note 2, § 7.8, at 177-80 (arguing that trade secret and confidential information should not be
divided by separate tests) and Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1144-45 (differentiating
between trade secrets and confidential information but applying same test). While both trade
secrets and confidential information require the same showing of competitive harm resulting
from disclosure, the courts sometimes differentiate between the nature of the information
involved. See Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 725 (analyzing validity of claim even after party admitted
that no trade secret existed). Distinguishing characteristics are, however, difficult to identify
because both types of information are characterized by similar sets of criteria. See Parsons,
85 F.R.D. at 726 (identifying confidential information on basis of five factors) ; RE TATEmENT
oF TORTS § 757 (identifying trade secrets on basis of six factors).
65. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 202-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(defining confidential information as that which would cause clearly defined, serious injury to
defendant's business if disclosed); United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (same); Bishop & Stiles, supra note 9, at 169 (defining confidential research and/or
development or commercial information as information that, if disclosed, will cause a clearly
defined and very serious injury); Campbell, supra note 2, at 781; Note, A Proposal, supra
note 34, at 1146-47 (stating that there is no test for determining whether information is
confidential information); Note, Court Approved Confidentiality Orders, supra note 43, at 91
(defining confidential information as information that, if disclosed, would cause clearly defined
and very serious injury to party's business).
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confidential and that a particular harm will result from disclosure.6
The seminal case on the confidential information standard is Parsons
v. General Motors Corp.67 In Parsons the plaintiff had received burns when
another car struck her automobile from behind, causing the fuel tank to
ignite. 68 The plaintiff, suing for alleged defects in the placement of the fuel
tank, requested discovery of crash tests and design information. 69 Although
admitting that the information was not a trade secret, the defendant claimed
that the requested material was confidential within the meaning of Rule
26(c)(7). 70 The Georgia district court denied the motion for a protective
order.7' The court defined good cause for purposes of the confidential
information provision of Rule 26(c)(7) to require the defendant to show
both that the material was confidential and that disclosure would cause
competitive harm.72 In finding that the material was not confidential, the
court found five factors significant: no claim had been made as to the
number of people to whom the material already had been disclosed; no
measures to insure secrecy had been alleged; no claim had been made as to
the confidentiality of aged information; some information would have to
be disclosed to the government; and no claim had been made as to which
information was already part of the public record.73 Thus, the defendant
had not met the threshold requirements for confidentiality pursuant to Rule
26(c)(7). 74 In ruling on the harm requirement, the court held that good
cause required specific examples where the defendant had alleged only vague
and conclusory injuries. 75
The Parsons court noted that once the party shows that a trade secret
or confidential information exists, the party requesting a protective order
must still show the harm that disclosure would cause. 76 The courts require
a showing that disclosure of the information will work a clearly defined
and very serious competitive injury to the defendant?7 Additionally, to
66. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text (noting Parsons court's requirement
that defendant prove both confidential nature of information and competitive harm to be
caused by disclosure).
67. 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980).





73. Id. at 726.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. See American Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(requiring party seeking protective order to show that disclosure might be harmful after
showing that information is confidential).
77. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying
clearly defined and very serious injury test); Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 726 (requiring showing
that disclosure will cause competitive disadvantage); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F.
Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying clearly defined and serious injury to business
standard); United States v. IBM Corp., 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (applying very serious
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show good cause the defendant must provide specific examples of potential
harm to business .7  Further, conclusory statements or vague allegations are
insufficient.7 9 Likewise, affidavits by the attorney alleging competitive harm
are insufficient to show a definite injury.80 Further, to alert the public to
possible safety concerns, the court may allow dissemination to the public
even if the information does constitute a trade secret.
8
1
In addition to the legitimate, judicially recognized objectives of pro-
tecting discovery information from disclosure that could cause competitive
harm, defendant manufacturers also use protective orders to impede collat-
eral lawsuits. 82 Protective orders that restrict dissemination to all but the
parties of the immediate lawsuit have several strategic advantages for the
defendant.8 3 Initially, protective orders serve the defendant's interests by
isolating each plaintiff and precluding consultation or collaboration among
similarly situated plaintiffs.84 The order may increase greatly the expense of
discovery by forcing each plaintiff to conduct formal, duplicative, and
injury standard). But see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866, 891 n.43 (E.D. Penn. 1981) (questioning the higher standard used in IBM).
78. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 891 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (holding that party must show specific instances where disclosure will cause com-
petitive disadvantage); United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421
(W.D.N.Y. 1981) (denying motion for order because defendant cited no specific instances
where disclosure would cause competitive disadvantage); Parsons, 85 F.R.D. at 726 (same);
Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (requiring showing of
particularity that confidential information will be revealed). Allegations that the plaintiff will
share the information with collateral litigants are not sufficient to show good cause for a
protective order. See Hooker, 90 F.R.D. at 426 (holding that sharing of discovery information
with collateral litigants is within purposes of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); Parsons, 85
F.R.D. at 726 n.1 (holding that possibility that plaintiff will share discovery information with
other litigants does not constitute good cause); Note, Anti-Dissemination Orders, supra note
45, at 512 (noting that possibility of information sharing with other litigants is not good
cause).
79. See Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 891 (holding conclusory statements insufficient); United
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 421, 425 (W.D.N.Y. 1981) (same);
Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (same).
80. See Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 891 (stating that hearsay allegations in counsel's brief
or affidavit are insufficient); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Barron's, 428 F. Supp. 200, 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (same). The Reliance court, however, considered hearsay allegations in affidavits after
recognizing that the plaintiff could have produced non-hearsay affidavits given time. 428 F.
Supp. at 203.
81. See Hooker Chems., 90 F.R.D. at 424-45 (recognizing that ,countervailing interests
may mandate denial of protective order despite existence of good cause).
82. See F. HARE, J. GBERT & W. REMm'a, supra note 2, § 7.6, at 169-72 (noting
tactical advantages that defendants obtain by use of protective orders); Devine, Litigation
Groups Aid Plaintiffs, 11 LEADER'S PROD. LLAB. 1, 6 (1985) (arguing that manufacturers use
protective orders to isolate plaintiffs); Riley & Hoefer, supra note 22, at 32 (arguing that
manufacturers use protective orders to inhibit cooperation between plaintiffs).
83. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text (discussing strategic advantages).
84. See F. HARE, J. GIBERT & W. RMiaN, supra note 2, § 6.6, at 126 (noting isolation
of plaintiffs through protective orders); Coben, Protective Orders: Manufacturers Hide Behind
Them, TRi, August 1986, at 36 (same); see also infra notes 115-139 (discussing plaintiff's
information sharing).
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extensive discovery in each case.8 In fact, plaintiffs' attorneys have asserted
that the strategic interest is actually the primary objective of the defendant's
motion for a protective order. 6 Empirically, manufacturers have attempted
to limit the ability of the plaintiffs' attorneys to organize and share infor-
mation through the use of protective orders.87 Although impeding lawsuits
by making the discovery process more difficult and expensive clearly is not
a legitimate interest, defendants can obtain a strategic advantage by using
protective orders to impede lawsuits.8"
In resisting discovery, defendant manufacturers often request a type of
protective order called an "umbrella order."8 9 Umbrella orders allow the
disclosing party to designate large amounts of documents as confidential
and then require the plaintiff to challenge the order for specific documentsP°
A court may issue an umbrella order upon a threshold showing of good
85. See Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1151 (noting savings to plaintiffs who are
permitted to share information); Corboy, Masked and Muzzled, Litigants Tell No Evil: Is This
Blind Justice?, Legal Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at 29, col. I (same). In Graham v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 118 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan. 1988), involving birth defects from the DPT vaccine,
discovery costs reached $200,000. Id. The Graham court rejected a confidentiality order on
the basis of judicial efficiency and the possibility of prohibitive costs to future plaintiffs. Id.
86. See T. Kmny, PREPAmwN PRODUCTS LImrlr CAS=s 225 (1986) (arguing that cor-
porate fear of information sharing is major factor in protective order requests); Hare &
Gilbert, Resisting Confidentiality Orders, TwmA, October 1990, at 50 (arguing that manufac-
turers seek protective orders to isolate plaintiff's counsel, not to protect trade secrets); Riley
& Hoefer, supra note 22, at 32 (stating that defendant's purpose is to prevent coordination
of plaintiff's efforts); Blum, Protective Orders Under Attack, Nat'l L.J., May 8, 1989, at 3
(describing Association of Trial Lawyers of America resolution condemning protective orders
when used to protect defendant from other litigation).
87. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 90-93 (D.N.J. 1986) (rejecting
defendant's claim that protective order was justified on basis of injury to be caused by use in
collateral litigation), aff'd, 822 F.2d 335 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976 (1987); M.
DoimnRos, DiscovERY § 1.20, at 47-48 (1986) (noting use of protective orders as method to
impede collateral litigation); T. Kmsy, supra note 86, § 7.21, at 225 (same); Devine, supra
note 82, at 6 (same); Riley & Hoefer, supra note 22, at 33 (arguing that manufacturer's motive
in requesting protective order is to prevent other litigants' access to information).
As an alternative to a protective order, defendants may copyright certain documents.
Fanning, The Ultimate Paper Chase, FoRBEs, May 2, 1988, at 108 (noting new defense strategy
of copyrighting documents). Copyrighting discovery documents prevents copying and inhibits
exchange among plaintiffs' attorneys even when information sharing is allowed. Id.
88. Thomas, supra note 2, at 363-64 (noting strategic purpose of protective orders when
used to inhibit litigation and avoid government regulators).
89. See United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir.
1990) (noting that stipulated umbrella protective orders have become standard practice in
complex cases); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1111 (3d Cir. 1986) (approving
of use of umbrella orders in complex litigation); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (noting virtual unanimity of use of
protective orders by courts involved in complex litigation); Marcus, supra, note 5, at 9 (noting
that stipulated umbrella orders have become standard practice).
90. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 786 (describing umbrella order procedure). Once the
order is entered, the plaintiff may challenge the confidentiality of specific documents. Id. The
defendant must demonstrate the validity of the order with regard to the challenged documents.
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cause and, therefore, potentially negate the requirements of particularized
harm and of showing that the information is confidential. 9 For example,
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,92 cigarette smokers instituted a products
liability action against several cigarette manufacturers, who requested an
umbrella protective order. 93 The Third Circuit approved of the magistrate's
umbrella order approach as an advantageous technique for cases with large-
scale discovery. 94 The court reasoned that the burden of proving confiden-
tiality remained with the moving party, although the burden of raising the
issue with respect to specific documents would shift to the party resisting
the protective order.9
The umbrella order has several drawbacks, however, both to the plaintiff
and to judicial efficiency generally.96 First, an umbrella order merely defers
the inquiry into specific documents until a later point in the litigation.
97
91. See F. HARE, J. GILBET & W. REMinE, supra note 2, § 4.10, at 54 (noting negation
of traditional burdens of party seeking protective order). As evidence of the negation of Rule
26(c)'s burdens, umbrella orders allow the parties to meet the confidential information
requirement merely by stating that the information is confidential. See Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 875 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (defining confidential
information for purposes of protective order as any information that is designated confidential
by parties at time of disclosure).
92. 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986).
93. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1986). In Cipollone,
the Third Circuit considered the validity of umbrella orders that would allow the moving party
to designate a number of documents confidential upon a threshold showing of good cause.
Id. at 1121-23. In two cases involving product suits against cigarette manufacturers, a federal
magistrate issued a broad umbrella protective orders that the district court subsequently revised
heavily. Id. at 1110. The magistrate's umbrella protective order would have allowed the
defendant to designate any documents as confidential. Id. at 1112. The district court amended
the order to require document-by-document inspection to determine confidentiality. Id. at
1115-16. The district court also amended the order by limiting the protective order to items
designated confidential, allowing the plaintiff's counsel to use the material in successive
litigation and eliminating the requirement to return or destroy the material. Id. at 1115. The
revised orders allowed later public dissemination and use of the documents by plaintiff's
counsel in other cases. Id. at 1110-11. On appeal of the order, the Third Circuit specifically
approved of the use of umbrella orders, saying that although the moving party had the burden
of justifying the confidentiality of every document, the district court could enter an order to
deal with large-scale litigation. Id. at 1122-23.
94. Id. at 1122. The M AUAL FOR CoMLXrx LrIA11oN SEcOND also approves of the
umbrella order approach as an alternative to a costly and time-consuming document-by-
document approach. See MANUAL FoR ComPLnx LmoATiON, SEcoND § 21.431, at 51-54 (1986)
(approving of umbrella protective orders); see also Chambers Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., 104 F.R.D. 133, 135 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (approving of umbrella orders); In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 96 F.R.D. 582, 583 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Campbell, supra note
2, at 785-88 (approving of umbrella orders as preventing delay and improving judicial
efficiency).
95. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1122-23 (3d Cir. 1986).
96. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of umbrella
orders).
97. See F. HARE, J. GELBERT & W. REMiUN, supra note 2, § 4.10, at 55 (noting umbrella
order's tendency to postpone inquiry until later date). Because the court conducts no close
scrutiny of the information until a challenge occurs, umbrella orders create a potential for
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Second, the umbrella order, by shifting the burden of challenge to the
plaintiff, may induce a court to place a greater burden than appropriate on
the plaintiff when challenging the designation of specific documents.98
Additionally, the plaintiff may wish to avoid incurring the court's disfavor
with repeated challenges and, therefore, not make challenges that normally
would have been appropriate." Further, the umbrella order provides a
monitoring advantage to the defendant, who is able to keep track of the
plaintiff's preparation by examining the documents that the plaintiff is
challenging. °° Finally, umbrella orders exacerbate the disadvantages of
protective orders generally by allowing courts to use a shortcut that elevates
judicial efficiency to the level of an overriding interest. 01
With judicial efficiency as one of the primary goals of the Federal
Rules, the plaintiff's interest coincides to a great degree with the aims of
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 (Rule 1).1 2 Rule 1 guides construction
overdesignation of material as confidential. See Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1122 n.17 (noting
danger that counsel will designate as confidential material that is not entitled to protection);
MANUAL FOR CoPLxEX LmoATION, SECOND § 21.431 (1986) (noting tendency of counsel to
designate as confidential any potentially sensitive documents). The MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LMOATON, SECOND suggests that courts view the confidentiality designation as a motion for
a protective order, making the designation subject to Rule 26(g) sanctions. Id.
98. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Pa.
1981), an antitrust action with particularly large-scale discovery, the district court entered an
umbrella protective order that both parties used. Id. at 874-75. The order allowed the disclosing
party to designate any disclosed information as confidential. Id. at 875. After summary
judgment for the defendants, the plaintiffs moved to declassify the protected information. Id.
at 873. In upholding the continuing validity of the protective order, the court charged that
the plaintiffs had ratified the protective order on three bases. Id. at 875. First, the plaintiffs
had used the protective order themselves. Id. Second, the plaintiffs had failed to challenge the
order during the course of the litigation. Id. Finally, the plaintiffs had failed to challenge
specific documents made confidential by the order. Id. at 875. The factors cited by the Zenith
court demonstrate the possibility that the court will impose additional burdens on the plaintiff,
negating the burden requirements of Rule 26(c). Id. See F. HARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMInE,
supra note 2, § 4.10, at 55-56 (noting possibility that courts will overlook necessary inquiries
with umbrella orders). The Zenith court required that the plaintiff perform in certain ways
during the course of the litigation, or risk ratification of the court's order as to each document
protected by the umbrella order. See Zenith, 529 F. Supp. at 873-75. The court ignored the
question of whether the documents actually were entitled to protection, focusing instead on
the plaintiff's conduct with respect to the umbrella order. Id.
99. See F. HARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMnm, supra note 2, § 4.10, at 56 (noting that
plaintiff's counsel will wish to avoid disfavor created by motion for wholesale declassification);
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LTIGATON, SECOND § 21.431 (1986) (noting possibility of major
problems involved with later declassification of information covered by umbrella order).
100. See F. HARE, J. GmBERT & W. RIMnrE, supra note 2, § 4.10, at 55-56 (discussing
monitoring advantage). The plaintiff is unlikely to challenge any but those dociments that are
most crucial to the case. See id. (noting counterproductivity of challenging designation of
nonessential documents). Thus, the defendant is able to discover on which parts of the case
the plaintiff intends to concentrate. See id. (noting that defendants can discover thought
processes of plaintiff by analyzing which documents are challenged).
101. See id. at 56 (noting danger of viewing umbrella orders as shortcut).
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 153-54 (W.D.
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of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure towards just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of suits. 03 Drawn-out litigation and excessive costs often benefit
the defendant exclusively, making the plaintiff's interest in the goals of
Rule 1 more significant than the defendant's interest."04 Moreover, discussion
of the plaintiff's interest involves a broader perspective, focusing on plain-
tiffs as a group instead of as individual parties to an action.105 When
resisting highly restrictive protective orders, plaintiffs as a group, therefore,
use the two related interests of information sharing' °6 and First Amendment
rights' 07 to support their resistance.
Despite having the role of initiator of the legal conflict, the plaintiff is
often the victim of a process that makes litigation a financial burden. 08
Depositions, expert consultants, court reporters, exhibits, and attorneys fees
make complex civil litigation a very expensive undertaking.' °9 Protective
orders multiply litigation costs by forcing individual plaintiffs in similar
cases to repeat the same costly discovery process to obtain the same
information from the same defendant.110 Operating under the restriction of
a protective order also forces the plaintiff to evaluate a huge amount of
documents that other plaintiffs have already evaluated."' Additionally, the
plaintiff must take the time to consult with experts who must also analyze
Tex. 1980) (noting that information sharing between plaintiffs coincides with goals of Rule 1);
Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1140-42 (discussing plaintiffs' interests as coinciding with
goals of Rule 1). The discovery provisions of the Federal Rules are subject to the guidance of
Rule 1. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (subjecting discovery provisions to
Rule 1).
103. FED. R. Crv. P. 1.
104. See supra note 85 (discussing relative benefits of inexpensive litigation to plaintiffs
and defendants).
105. See generally Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (discussing benefits
of information sharing in terms of plaintiffs as a class); F. HARE, J. GLBERT & W. REMIsa,
supra note 2, § 2.5 (discussing cooperative efforts of plaintiffs as class); Note, A Proposal,
supra note 34, at 1151-53 (resolving plaintiffs' problems of expense, delay, injustice, and First
Amendment concerns by reference to cooperation of plaintiffs).
106. See infra notes 115-139 and accompanying text (discussing information sharing).
107. See infra notes 140-169 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment rights).
108. See Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1140-41 (discussing burden on plaintiff of
expensive products liability litigation). Several prominent products cases have had discovery
costing hundreds of thousands of dollars. See id. (reporting plaintiff's discovery costs in two
Rely tampon cases as $72,000 and $50,000); Legal Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at, 28, col. 3 (noting
that plaintiff discovery cost in DPT vaccine litigation was $200,000).
109. See Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1140-41 (discussing excessive discovery costs
in complex litigation).
110. See Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 118 F.R.D. 511, 513 (D. Kan. 1988) (setting
aside protective order because of potential of unnecessary repetition and expense); Garcia v.
Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (noting that current system forces parties unnecessarily
to repeat discovery); F. HARE, J. GnLBERT & W. RMun, supra note 2, § 2.4, at 15 (noting
proliferation of costs by isolation of plaintiffs through protective orders).
111. See F. Hmm, J. GILBERT & W. REMniN, supra note 2, § 2.4, at 14 (noting protective
orders' tendency to force plaintiffs to repetitively evaluate information); Ranii, How the
Plaintiffs' Bar Shares Its Information, Nat'l L.J., July 23, 1984, at 1 (noting advantage of
litigation groups that may have already discovered smoking guns in mass of documents).
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the documents." 2 Challenging an umbrella protective order further compli-
cates the plaintiff's task by imposing additional burdens on plaintiffs.1 1 3
Thus, protective orders that allow information sharing can substantially
reduce the burdens that the discovery process imposes on the plaintiff., 4
Information sharing refers to the exchange of discovery between plain-
tiffs involved in similar litigation, implicating both plaintiff and public
interests." 5 Collaborative mechanisms for defendants are routine in complex
litigation." 6 Moreover, plaintiffs in multidistrict or class action cases have
112. See F. RARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMn-E, supra note 2, § 2.4, at 14 (discussing
plaintiff's need to consult with experts).
113. See supra notes 89-101 (discussing burdens imposed on plaintiff by umbrella orders).
114. See infra notes 115-139 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of information
sharing). As an example of one court's novel attempt to resolve the problem of increasing
litigation costs, Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 118 F.R.D. 511 (D. Kan. 1988), demonstrates
both the need for a solution to rising costs and the difficulties involved with piecemeal judicial
efforts to solve the problems inherent in closing discovery to future litigants. See id. (resolving
problem of costs involved with mass product litigation by creation of litigation library).
Graham was a product liability case involving the DTP vaccine. Id. The DTP vaccine is used
to immunize children against diphtheria, tetanus (lockjaw), and pertussis (whooping cough).
See Graham v. Wyeth Laboratories, 906 F.2d 1399, 1402 (10th Cir.) (describing DTP vaccine),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 811 (1990). The pertussis vaccine allegedly caused severe reactions in
some children, including permanent physical and neurological damage. See Jones v. Lederle
Laboratories, 695 F. Supp. 700, 704 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (describing damage allegedly caused by
DTP vaccine). In Graham, discovery costs amounted to approximately $200,000. See supra
note 108 and accompanying text (noting costs of litigation in DTP vaccine case). The jury
entered a verdict for the plaintiff against a manufacturer of the DPT vaccine. Id. at 512. The
plaintiff subsequently requested modification of the protective order that the court had issued
to prevent dissemination of trade secrets and confidential information that the defendant
supplied. Id. The Graham court noted that no trade secrets had been revealed by the record,
that the company had quit producing the vaccine, and thus the defendant faced no risk of
competitive injury by disclosure. Id. In modifying the order the Graham court ordered the
creation of a DTP vaccine library to include all discovery documents that the parties produced,
to be used by other DTP vaccine litigants. Id. at 513. The Graham court recognized that the
library could substantially reduce costs and discovery repetition, maximizing judicial efficiency.
Id. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit approved of the protective order modification, but held that
the district court had no authority to establish such a library. Wyeth Laboratories v. United
States Dist. Court, 851 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1988).
Despite reversing the mechanism employed by the court, the Tenth Circuit recognized the
district court's goal as laudable and just. Id. at 324. Specifically, the appellate court noted
that eliminating the need for duplicative discovery by providing previously disclosed information
to similarly situated litigants would result in lower costs and delay. Id. at 323-24. Although
not specifically mentioned by the Wyeth court, the language demonstrates the desirability of
information sharing as a mechanism to reduce litigation costs. See id. at 323 (discussing
desirability of mechanisms to reduce litigation costs).
115. See T. KIELY, supra note 86, at 226-228 (describing information sharing and collision
of defendant and plaintiff interests).
116. See S.M.U. PROD. LLAB. INST., DIscovERY, EVIDENCE AND TACTICS IN THE TRIAL OF
A PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAwsurr § 4.02[3] [b] (1987) (discussing defendant's access to collab-
orative mechanism); Coben, supra note 84, at 34 (same); Devine, supra note 82, at 1 (1985)
(same); Mason & Hare, The Use of FRCP 26(c)(7) to Prevent or Limit the Dissemination of
"Internal Documents", 7 J. PROD. LtAB. 1 (1984) (same); Weiner, Coordinating the Defense
of Similar Lawsuits, FOR THE DEFENSE, May, 1990, at 5 (same); Ranii, For the Other Side:
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the right to share information; plaintiffs in non-grouped cases hope that,
as a matter of consistency, the courts will not burden them with additional
disclosure restrictions.'17 Protective orders that completely restrict dissemi-
nation beyond the parties block collaborative efforts that could streamline
the judicial process and lower litigation costs. 18
Patterson v. Ford Motor Co. 119 is the seminal .products liability case in
the area of information sharing and recognizes the desirable effects of
information sharing.'2 In Patterson the defendant moved for a restrictive
protective order for the stated purpose of preventing use of the discovered
information by the plaintiff's attorneys in subsequent litigation. 12 The
district court explicitly rejected the possibility of information sharing among
plaintiff's attorneys as a ground for a protective order.' 22 Further, the court
adopted the view that information sharing is a desirable method of reducing
litigation time and cost that coincides with the three-part objective of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of litigation.1' 3
In Garcia v. Peeples, however, the wider-reaching advantages of infor-
mation sharing were achieved to a great degree.2' In Garcia the plaintiff's
automobile was struck from behind, causing it to burst into flames. 2 5 The
Defense Lawyer Group Gaining New Vitality, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 13, 1983, at 1 (same); Legal
Times, Jan. 8, 1990, at 28 (same).
117. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976) (allowing multidistrict consolidation of claims with
common questions of fact); FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (allowing class actions if joinder is impracticable,
claims present common questions of law or fact, claims are representative of class, and fair
and adequate protection of class interests)
118. See F. HARE, J. GLERT, & W. REMiNE supra note 2, § 5.2, at 76-77 (discussing
importance of promoting collaborative efforts). The increasing activities of plaintiff support
groups like the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, the Attorneys Information Exchange
Group and Trial Lawyers for Public Justice (or Project Access), in both the legislative and
judicial arenas has contributed to greater organization in the plaintiff's bar, especially with
respect to information sharing. See Ranii, supra note 111, at I (noting benefits of organization
among plaintiff's attorneys); Weiner, supra note 43, at 5 (same); see also Rheingold, The
MER/29 Story-An Instance of Successful Mass Disaster Litigation, 56 CArrF. L. Rnv. 116,
122 (1968) (describing Association of Trial Lawyers of America convention to coordinate
strategy in anti-cholesterol drug litigation).
119. 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
120. Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152 (W.D. Tex. 1980).
121. Id.
122. Id. See Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987) (recognizing value of
cooperative discovery efforts); Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579 (D. Colo. 1982)
(same); In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482, 484-85 (E.D.
Mich. 1979) (same); Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973)
(same); Williams v. Johnson & Johnson, 50 F.R.D. 31, 32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (same); Farnum
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 339 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 1983) (same); Earl v. Gulf & W. Mfg.
Co., 123 Wis. 2d 200, -, 366 N.W.2d 160, 164-65 (Ct. App. 1985) (same).
123. Patterson, 85 F.R.D. at 154 (recognizing value of cooperative efforts). See Marcus,
supra note 5, at 41 (noting that modification of protective order to allow information sharing
furthers goals of Rule 1).
124. 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987).
125. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 344 (Tex. 1987). In Garcia, the survivor of a
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plaintiff sued the manufacturer and dealer, alleging that a defect in the
design of the fuel system had caused the fuel-fed fire.' 6 In Garcia the Texas
Supreme Court considered whether protective orders should allow infor-
mation sharing among attorneys involved in similar litigation. 27 The Garcia
court reasoned that even if trade secrets existed, the court must weigh the
strong public policy favoring shared discovery against the defendant's in-
terest in preserving trade secrets. 28 The Texas Supreme Court, therefore,
required lower courts to tailor protective orders to allow information shar-
ing. 2 9 The Garcia court found that information sharing furthered two
substantial goals: making discovery more truthful by forcing parties to be
consistent in their responses, 30 and streamlining the discovery process.' 3'
Moreover, because information sharing does not diminish the value of the
property, there is no significant harm in allowing such exchanges. 3 2 Because
substantial case law supports the position adopted by the Garcia court in
favor of information sharing, information sharing has achieved some ac-
ceptance as a judicial policy."'33 In Texas, for example, Garcia independently
car crash whose vehicle burst into flames after being hit from behind by another car sued the
manufacturer and the dealership based on a defect in the design of the fuel system. Id. The
trial court entered an umbrella protective order restricting the plaintiff from disseminating
discovery materials. Id. at 344-45. The Texas Supreme Court found that, although trade secrets
did exist, public policy favored shared discovery, which had the benefits of encouraging truthful
discovery and judicial efficiency. Id. at 347-48. The court found that a balance of these
interests mandates that the protective order block dissemination only to the defendant's
competitors. Id. at 348.




130. Id. at 347. See also Buehler v. Whalen, 374 N.E.2d 460, 467 (Ill. 1977) (discussing
vital test information withheld from plaintiff that plaintiff had obtained through collateral
litigation); F. HARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMINE, supra note 2, § 2.6, at 17-18 (discussing
verification advantage of information sharing).
131. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987); see also Wilk v. American
Medical Ass'n, 635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (noting efficiency advantages of information
sharing); AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971
(1979); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Pickens, 105 F.R.D. 545, 551 (N.D. Tex. 1985) (same);
Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982) (same); Patterson v. Ford
Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (same); MANUAL FOR COML'.Ex LITIGATION
§ 3.11 (5th ed. 1982) (same); F. HARE, J. GILBERT & W. REMiNE, supra note 2, at 14-15;
Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1140 (same).
132. See Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 348, n.4 (notit1g lack of harm to defendant's value in
property through information sharing).
133. See id. at 347 (noting that majority of federal courts have supported information
sharing); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cranford Ins. Co., 905 F.2d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1990)
(adopting policy in favor of sharing discovery with collateral litigants absent prejudice to party
opposing dissemination), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991); Wilk v. American Medical Ass'n,
635 F.2d 1295, 1299 (7th Cir. 1980) (supporting information sharing as advantageous method
to cut costs and increase efficiency); AT&T v. Grady, 594 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir.) (same),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 971 (1979); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Pickens, 105 F.R.D. 545, 551
(N.D. Tex. 1985) (same); Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93 F.R.D. 579, 580 (D. Colo. 1982)
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has created a requirement that protective orders allow information sharing
among plaintiffs involved in similar litigation.' 34 The one limitation placed
on the generally accepted policy of information sharing is that the plaintiff
may not seek discovery merely for the purpose of assisting in the litigation
of another case.'35
Supporters of highly restrictive orders suggest that the risk of a leak
beyond the parties entitled to share information justifies prohibiting the
exchange between plaintiffs' attorneys. 136 However, the courts generally have
rejected this contention as entirely speculative. 37 Moreover, the overwhelm-
ing support that the courts have given to information sharing as an aid to
litigation in general indicates that the policy of information sharing has
relatively minor disadvantages. 13 Given the continued ability of defendants
to acquire protective orders that prevent competitive losses, information
sharing as a policy successfully balances the defendant's interest with the
plaintiff's need to avoid expensive and duplicative litigation.
139
A more controversial aspect of protective order analysis concerns the
First Amendment rights of plaintiffs. 14 The debate over whether a consti-
(same); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 92 F.R.D. 67, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(same); Patterson v. Ford Motor Co., 85 F.R.D. 152, 154 (W.D. Tex. 1980) (noting lack of
criticism of information sharing); Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 (N.D.
Ga. 1980) (noting that possibility of information sharing is not good cause for a protective
order); Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405 (N.D.N.Y. 1973).(same).
The sale of information presents a somewhat different problem and raises ethical consid-
erations. See Ranli, How the Plaintiff's Bar Shares its Information, Nat'l L.J., July 23, 1984
at I (discussing sale of information to other attorneys). In In re Upjohn Co. Antibiotic Cleocin
Prods. Liab. Litig., 81 F.R.D. 482 (E.D. Mich. 1979), aff'd, 664 F.2d 114 (6th Cir. 1981),
the court allowed the sale of information to other plaintiffs under court supervision. Id.
However, courts will fine attorneys who violate protective orders by selling information. See
Marcus, supra note 5, at 42-43 n.177 (noting fine of $10,000 levied against one attorney in
Toxic Shock Syndrome litigation who violated protective order by selling information).
134. See American Honda Motor Co. v. Dibrell, 736 S.W.2d 257 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that Garcia requires trial court to balance competing interests and allow information
sharing); Tex. Sup. Ct. Adv. Comm., Rule 76a: Transcripts, Agendas, Correspondence 1989-
90 v. 1 at 266 (Nov. 31, 1989 hearing before Supreme Court of Texas) (available through
Texas State Law Library) (noting that Garcia already requires information sharing'in Texas).
135. See Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724, 726 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1980)
(noting that protective order is justified to prevent information sharing in cases where discovery
is used merely to assist in other litigation).
136. See Note, Court-Approved Confidentiality Orders, supra note 43, at 93 (arguing that
allowing dissemination would result in competitive loss of confidentiality).
137. See Waelde v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 94 F.R.D. 27, 29-30 (E.D. Mich. 1981)
(rejecting defendant's contention that competitors would get information as speculative);
Johnson Foils, Inc. v. Huyck Corp., 61 F.R.D. 405, 410 (N.D.N.Y. 1973) (rejecting contention
that plaintiff would use information in illegitimate manner).
138. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing strong judicial support for
information sharing policy).
139. See supra notes 136-138 and accompanying text (discussing balance between defendant
and plaintiff interests with information sharing). "
140. See infra notes 141-169 and accompanying text (discussing First Amendment con-
cerns).
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tutional right to disseminate discovery exists has continued even in the wake
of the United States Supreme Court decision in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart.14' In Seattle Times the Supreme Court recognized that discovery
is a matter of legislative grace.' 42 Therefore, a First Amendment right of
access does not attach to information made available for purposes of the
suit. 143 Further, the Court noted that discovery traditionally is not a public
source of information and that protective orders are not a classic prior
restraint that would require exacting First Amendment scrutiny. 44 The
Seattle Times Court therefore held that a protective order that limits
dissemination of discovered information does not violate the First Amend-
ment, as long as the court issues the order on good cause, limits the order
to the context of discovery, and does not restrict the dissemination of the
information if available from other sources.14 By implication, Seattle Times
also forecloses the public right of access, as distinguished from the right to
disseminate, because allowing public access to information makes no sense
if the court has prohibited the parties from disseminating the information
to the public. 4' In the wake of Seattle Times, the circuit courts of appeal
have offered two interpretations of the Supreme Court's holding, and the
controversy over the First Amendment right to disseminate discovery ma-
terials has continued. 47
First, the District of Columbia and Third Circuits have read Seattle
Times as completely eliminating the First Amendment as a consideration in
protective order analysis. 4 For example, in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
141. 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
142. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984). In Seattle Times, the Supreme
Court considered whether a protective order that restricted dissemination of discovered infor-
mation constituted a violation of First Amendment freedoms. Id. at 27. A religious leader,
bringing a defamation suit against two newspapers, obtained a protective order to prevent
dissemination of a list of members and donors to the religious organization. Id. The trial
court initially had denied the motion, but granted the motion after affidavits detailed threats
against individuals affiliated with the organization. Id. at 26-27. The court issued the order
pursuant to the state of Washington's protective order provision. Id. at 26-27. The state had
modeled its provision after Federal Rule 26(c). Id. at 29 n.14; see WASH. SuPan. CT. Civ. R.
26(c). The Supreme Court first held that because discovery is a matter of legislative grace,
there is no First Amendment right of access to information available for purposes of the suit.
Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32. The Court further noted that restrictions on discovered material
were not a restriction on a traditionally public source of information. Id. at 33. Finally, the
court found that a protective order was not a classic prior restraint which would require
exacting First Amendment scrutiny. Id. at 33-34.
143. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32.
144. Id. at 33-34.
145. Id. at 37.
146. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 796 (noting logical conclusion that public can have
no right of access if parties themselves have no right to disseminate to public).
147. See Bishop & Stiles, supra note 9, at 169 (analyzing different interpretations of
Seattle Times among First, Second, and Third Circuits); infra notes 148-161 (discussing
interpretations of First, Second, Third and D.C. Circuits).
148. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that Seattle Times prohibits a court from considering First Amendment rights), cert. denied,
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Inc. 49 the Third Circuit ruled that the district court improperly had applied
a least restrictive alternative test 50 to the First Amendment analysis of a
protective order.151 In Cipollone the court explicitly rejected any First
Amendment factors in protective order analysis as irrelevent.'1 2 The Seattle
Times language cited by the district court appears to require that the
restrictions on First Amendment freedoms be as minimal as possible, thus
supporting the district court's conclusion in favor of a least restrictive
alternative test. 5 3 Although the Third Circuit recognized that its holding
was inconsistent with the Seattle Times language, the Third Circuit held
that the least restrictive means test was merely dictum that did not affect
the rest of the Supreme Court's holding.-
4
Second, the First Circuit has interpreted Seattle Times to require First
Amendment scrutiny with a lower standard than for traditional restraints
on expression. 5 In Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,'5 6 the First Circuit specifi-
479 U.S. 1043 (1987); New York v. United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 802-03 (3d
Cir. 1985) (holding that Seattle Times supports view that protective orders do not implicate
First Amendment); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 737 F.2d 1170, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(recognizing Seattle Times as rejecting First Amendment interests in protective order analysis);
Ericson v. Ford Motor Co., 107 F.R.D. 92, 94 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (analyzing Seattle Times as
holding that First Amendment protection is unwarranted for discovery materials).
149. 785 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1986).
150. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (3d Cir. 1986). With
reference to the least restrictive means test, the Supreme Court in Seattle Times stated that
part of the question of whether a party had the right to disseminate discovered information
involved analysis of whether the restrictions on the party's First Amendment rights were no
greater than necessary for protection of the governmental interest. Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 32 (1984) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974)).
Similar language is found in In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191-195 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and
in In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (lst Cir. 1981), which were the cases giving rise to
the conflict between the circuits that Seattle Times attempted to resolve. See Note, Clear
Standards for Discovery Protective Orders: A Missed Opportunity in Rhinehart v. Seattle
Times Co., 8 U. PUGET SoUND L. Rzv. 123, 137 (1984) (noting Supreme Court's attempt to
resolve conflicts between Halkin, San Juan Star, and Seattle Times). The Halkin court held
that judges restricting the dissemination of discovery pursuant to Rule 26(c) must evaluate the
First Amendment restriction based on three criteria. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 191. The harm of
dissemination must be substantial and serious, the restraining order must be narrow and
precise, and there must be no alternative means of protecting the public interest that intrudes
less directly on expression. Id. Likewise, the San Juan Star court, although applying a less
stringent First Amendment test, still required an evaluation of the availability of less restrictive
means of preventing the harm. San Juan Star, 662 F.2d at 116.
151. Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1118-19. The district court analyzed the protective order based
on whether the order limited First Amendment freedoms more than was necessary to protect
the governmental interest involved. Id. at 1114. The Third Circuit, however, held that despite
the Supreme Court's language, the holding of Seattle Times involved an entirely different
analysis that did not require a least restrictive means test. Id. The court noted that a least
restrictive means analysis of protective orders would be a more stringent First Amendment test
than the good cause analysis. Id. at 1118-19.
152. Id. at 1119.
153. Id. at 1113-14.
154. Id. at 1119.
155. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986). The Anderson court
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cally rejected the Third Circuit's interpretation, holding that Seattle Times
did not eliminate First Amendment consideration in protective order anal-
ysis, but merely that protective orders implicate the First Amendment to a
lesser degree than in other contexts. 57 The Anderson court's First Amend-
ment analysis revolved around the three criteria that the Supreme Court
articulated in Seattle Times. 58 A protective order issued on a showing of
good cause, limited to discovery, and not restricting the dissemination of
information gained from other sources would be valid under the Anderson
court's First Amendment analysis. 5 9 A prominent district court case affirmed
on other grounds by the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion, holding
that a showing of good cause was sufficient to allow a limitation of First
Amendment rights. 6' The good cause standard enunciated in Rule 26(c) is
thus the threshold for the First Circuit and at least one district court for
determining whether the protective order violates the First Amendment.'
6'
Because the three qualifications expressed by Seattle Times coincide
with the proper scope of a protective order, a properly entered order will
not violate the constitutional right of access.' 62 However, to be consistent
with the Supreme Court's language in Seattle Times, a court also must
ensure that the protective order is the least restrictive means necessary to
ensure protection of the specific interests.' 63 The Cipollone court simply
found that the First Amendment was still a factor requiring scrutiny within the framework of
the good cause requirement of Rule 26(c). Id. The Anderson court interpreted Seattle Times
as indicating that protective orders are restraints, although they affect the First Amendment
less than other types of restraints. Id.
156. 805 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1986).
157. Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986). Seattle Times forced the
First Circuit to reconsider its holding in In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1981).
Anderson, 805 F.2d at 5. In San Juan Star, the First Circuit applied the heightened scrutiny
test to the First Amendment in protective order analysis. See id. at 116 (applying heightened
First Amendment scrutiny to protective orders); Anderson, 805 F.2d at 6 (discussing San Juan
Star).
158. See Anderson, 805 F.2d at 7 (holding that First Amendment is not implicated if
protective order meets Seattle Times criteria).
159. See id. (discussing Seattle Times criteria).
160. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559, 570 (E.D.N.Y.) (holding
that in the absence of showing of good cause, First Amendment would be violated by
protection), affd on other grounds, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 344
(1987); see also Bishop & Stiles, supra note 9, at 170 (describing positions of First, Second
and Third Circuits); Campbell, supra note 2, at 798-801 (same). The Agent Orange appellate
court affirmed based on the statutory presumption argument, avoiding the First Amendment
issue. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 145 (holding that statutory argument sufficiently supported
district court's conclusion).
161. See Anderson, 805 F.2d at 7 (discussing First Circuit's good cause framework for
First Amendment scrutiny); Agent Orange, 104 F.R.D. at 566 (allowing limitation of public
access to discovery materials upon a showing of good cause).
162. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37 (1984).
163. See id. at 32 (requiring inquiry as to whether restrictions on First Amendment are
least restrictive means necessary for protection of governmental interest); supra notes 150-151
and accompanying text (discussing least restrictive means test).
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ignored the parts of Seattle Times that did not fit into the Cipollone
interpretation, instead of fashioning a theory which would be consistent
with the entire opinion. 1" The First Circuit, although recognizing the least
restrictive means language in Seattle Times, did not apply the language in
enunciating First Amendment criteria in Anderson.' 5 The Second Circuit
failed to recognize even that the Supreme Court had enunciated a least
restrictive means test.' 66 Given the language in Seattle Times, as well as the
inclusion of a least restrictive means requirement in both of the major pre-
Seattle Times cases, 67 a proper interpretation of Seattle Times should
account for the language concerning the lower threshold for First Amend-
ment violations in protective orders as well as the least restrictive means
policy.'" Application of the least restrictive means test theoretically would
require that protective orders allow information sharing, as long as the
practice is not abusive and continues to support the goals of Rule 26(c).
169
While the Seattle Times First Amendment analysis focuses entirely on
the plaintiff's interest, some of the plaintiffs or defendant's aims may be
identical to the aims of the public interest. °70 Because both public interest
and plaintiff needs favor inexpensive litigation, the public interest may
coincide in particular areas with the plaintiff's interest. To that extent,
information sharing represents an advantageous method for achieving plain-
tiff and public goals of judicial efficiency in discovery. 71 The public interest,
however, simultaneously coincides with the defendant interest in protecting
trade secrets or confidential information. 72 For example, the adoption of
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) by many jurisdictions is a manifes-
tation of the public interest in protecting trade secrets. 73 Additionally, Rule
164. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding
that least restrictive means language of Seattle Times is merely dicta which does not overcome
contrary direction of Court's holding).
165. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir. 1986) (outlining First
Amendment criteria as based on good cause framework).
166. See In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd,
821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 344 (1987) (omitting least restrictive means
from First Amendment analysis).
167. See supra note 150-151 (discussing least restrictive means tests in Seattle Times,
Halkin, and San Juan Star).
168. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text (discussing least restrictive means
test as part of Seattle Times).
169. See supra note 150 and accompanying text (defining least restrictive means test as
requiring that restriction on dissemination is no more than is necessary to prevent harm).
170. See Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1148 (noting that judicial system shares
most of plaintiff and defendant interests).
171. See supra notes 115-139 and accompanying text (discussing information sharing).
172. See infra notes 173-174 and accompanying text (noting public interest in maintaining
competitive business practices).
173. Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 437 (1985). As of 1990, 34 jurisdictions
have adopted the UTSA. Id. The UTSA's purpose as a manifestation of the public interest is
thus to protect valuable business assets. See Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video Center, Inc., 478
N.E.2d 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (noting that legislature's purpose in enacting UTSA was to
serve public interest by protecting trade secrets).
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26(c) and the state counterparts limit disclosure of trade secrets or confi-
dential information, representing a general public interest in preserving
competitive practices. 74 However, the public interest also represents the
three unique interests of public welfare, settlement, and public rights of
access that do not correspond to the personal goals of either plaintiff or
defendant.
1 71
Of the plaintiff, defendant, and public interests, the public interest is
the most socially significant because of the intense scrutiny of products
liability cases that reveal potential public hazards.176 Consumer products
that pose safety hazards constitute a significant concern to the public.
77
Because the judicial process has been the traditional avenue by which the
public and regulatory agencies learn of public hazards, protective orders
have limited the ability of the public and regulators to acquire that infor-
mation.178 By shielding the manufacturer's liability or settlements from the
public, protective orders exacerbate the harms of defective products.
179
Although no statutory criteria exists for evaluating the public interest, several
courts have indicated that public welfare may be an overriding interest in
deciding whether to grant a protective order.8 0 Moreover, legislative revi-
sions of protective order policy indicate a trend towards recognizing public
safety as a more important factor in protective order analysis. 8'
174. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text (discussing Rule 26(c) and state
protective order statutes).
175. See infra notes 176-229 and accompanying text (discussing specific goals of the public
interest).
176. See F. HAR, J. GLBERT & W. REMwnE, supra note 2, at 66-67 (noting consumer
concern for products which pose safety hazards); Note, Use of Discovery Materials, supra
note 28, at 200 (noting public importance of information produced in product liability actions);
see also Legal Times, March 26, 1990, at 6, col. I (discussing Pfizer defective heart-valve
litigation); USA Today, March 16, 1989 at 6A (discussing Pfizer, Inc. heart-valve, Xerox
chemical contamination, General Motors fuel tank and Johnson & Johnson painkiller litiga-
tions); Wash. Post, Feb. 20, 1989, at BI (noting that General Motors and Johnson & Johnson
used protective orders to avoid public debates about safety); Wash. Post, October 23, 1988,
at Al (noting General Motors' strategy of nondisclosure of auto safety documents).
177. See F. Hm, J. GILBERT & W. REMm, supra note 2, at 66, 127 (noting public
interest in mass-marketed hazardous products).
178. See Note, Sealed v. Sealed, supra note 5, at 397 n.85 (noting concern in media and
consumer groups that secrecy is concealing public hazards). But see Weiner, Keeping Confi-
dences: Protective Orders Not for Dirty Little Secrets, Legal Times, January 29, 1990, at 24
(arguing that there is no safety problem because plaintiffs still may complain to regulatory
agencies or have order lifted).
179. See F. Hmnn, J. GLBERT & W. RamwE, supra note 2, at 68 (noting that secrecy
agreements impede regulatory and law enforcement actions).
180. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165, 1180 (6th Cir.
1983) (allowing unsealing of documents because information relevant to public health), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1100 (1984); see also Anchorage School Dist. v. Anchorage Daily News, 779
P.2d 1191 (Alaska 1989) (finding public's right to know paramount); Freeman & Jenner, Just
Say No: Resisting Protective Orders, TRiL, March, 1990, at 70 (noting that recent decisions
have stressed value of public health and welfare over interest in promoting settlement).
181. See infra notes 246-247, 261, 284-288 and accompanying text (discussing goals of
public safety in legislative action).
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The public safety goal of litigation poses several problems.1 2 Rule 26(c)
allows a judge to weigh the public interest after a determination of good
cause, balancing the interests before deciding whether a protective order is
necessary."8 3 Because discovery information has not been subjected to the
trial process, the information may not be sufficiently reliable to warrant
disclosure.' 4 Inaccurate information may damage the manufacturer's repu-
tation and business.' Limiting the judges' discretion to balance the interests
when public safety is at issue risks damage to the public in the form of
unfounded allegations of public hazard and risks greater competitive damage
to the litigants.'"
As a shift from the public goal of safety, the public interest in settle-
ments focuses on the desirability of judicial efficiency. 8 7 Protective orders
facilitate the settlement process in two ways.' First, because the lack of
available protection may cause parties to resist discovery, protective orders
may promote full disclosure between the parties.8 9 Unless the defendant
abuses discovery, however, full disclosure should not depend on the existence
of a protective order. 9° Resistive discovery practices undermine the goals
of full disclosure that the federal rules and modem case law mandate.' 9'
Because protective order provisions are not enforcement mechanisms to
ensure discovery, to impose the role of policeman on protective orders is
inappropriate.'9
Second, protective orders encourage settlement by allowing limits on
disclosure to become part of the settlement agreement. 193 The parties may
182. See infra notes 183-186 (discussing problems of imposing public interest on protective
order determination).
183. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing public interest as part of
balance between competing interests in protective order analysis); Miller, Privacy, Secrecy and
the Public Interest, FOR Ta DE ENSE, Sept. 1990, at 9 (arguing that judge is uniquely qualified
to make decisions concerning public welfare).
184. See Miller, supra note 183 and accompanying text (noting that information must be
subjected to full trial process because pretrial information is inherently unreliable).
185. See id. (discussing risks of unreliable discovery information).
186. See id. (arguing that only judge can make decision regarding public safety interests).
187. See Miller, supra note 183, at 11 (noting that availability of discovery may save
court system and litigants expense of litigation by encouraging settlement).
188. See infra notes 189-199 and accompanying text (discussing protective orders effect
on settlements).
189. See Note, Court-Approved Confidentiality Orders, supra note 43, at 92 (noting risk
that lack of protective orders will inhibit full disclosure and likelihood of settlement); Wittner
& Campbell, Protective Orders Under Attack, American Corp. Counsel Assoc. Docket, at 14
(Jan. 1990) (arguing that full discovery encourages settlement); Miller, supra note 183, at 11
(arguing that the availability of discovery leads parties to settle and that protective orders will
cause resistance to discovery).
190. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (recognizing truth-seeking function
of discovery).
191. See Fa. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (advocating broad disclosure); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507
(same); Campbell, supra note 2, at 776-77 (noting that discovery rules, and Rule 26(b) in
particular, advocate full disclosure).
192. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (detailing sanctions for abuse of discovery process).
193. See infra notes 194-199 and accompanying text (discussing settlements that incorporate
terms of protective order).
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condition their willingness to settle on the guarantee in an agreement that
the protective order will continue to protect discovery information. 94 A
general public right of access to discovered materials or to the terms of a
settlement would diminish the defendant's motivation for settlement.
95
However, a less than absolute right of access, such as allowing information
sharing among plaintiffs, would retain substantial benefits for the defendant
when proposing settlement. 196 Moreover, the public interest in settlement
should not override other policies favoring greater access to discovery.'9
To that extent, the public interest in health or judicial efficiency should
override any possible adverse effect to settlements. 9 Additionally, the lower
discovery expenses associated with information sharing may contribute to
an increase in settlements, as the parties are less likely to settle if unnecessary
amounts of money are spent to conduct duplicitous discovery.' 99
The public interest in protective orders also concerns the question of a
public right of access to judicial proceedings.2 Despite the Seattle Times
holding, which largely forecloses the First Amendment arguments for access
to discovery materials by members of the general public, 2°1 the common
law provides non-constitutional support for a public right of access to
discovery materials.2 The courts have recognized a common-law presump-
194. See Wittner & Campbell, supra note 189, at 14 (noting that both plaintiffs and
defendants may condition settlement on nondisclosure of terms or discovery). The parties'
willingness to settle may depend upon nondisclosure of the terms of the agreement. See Note,
Sealed v. Sealed, supra note 5, at 405-408 (discussing settlement process and interests involved
in obtaining sealed settlements). However, the sealing of settlement agreements is beyond the
scope of a discussion concerning protective orders for discovery. See id. at 383-84 (distinguishing
between types of confidentiality orders). While several states have dealt with the two problems
concurrently, analysis of the balances created in discovery requires a more limited discussion.
See id. (discussing secrecy in terms of settlement agreements and total sealing orders).
195. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 28 (discussing party's willingness to settle based on
court order blocking disclosure of settlement terms or discovery information); Note, Court-
Approved Confidentiality Orders, supra note 43, at 92 (same); Weiner, supra note 43, at 13
(noting that defendants are less likely to give generous settlements if terms are publicized).
196. See Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1149-50 (noting that information sharing
would continue to protect defendant's interests).
197. See Note, Sealed v. Sealed, supra note 5, at 407 (stating that public policy favoring
settlements should not override other strong public policies).
198. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (noting instances of unsealing of records
when public welfare is implicated).
199. See F. H~AR, J. GIBERT & W. RIMnmm, supra note 2, at 15 (noting verification,
decreased expense, and decreased delay advantages of information sharing); Note, Court-
Approved Confidentiality Orders, supra note 43, at 92 (citing expense and delay as two factors
relevant to decision to settle).
200. See supra notes 140-169 (discussing constitutional theory of access); infra notes 203-
228 and accompanying text (discussing common-law and statutory theories of access).
201. See supra notes 140-169 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiff's First Amend-
ment right to disseminate).




tion that the.public may inspect judicial records. 2 3 The common-law right
derives from the need for a public watchdog to guarantee democratic
processes. 2°4 However, like the constitutional right of access, the courts have
not extended to discovery the common-law right of access to judicial
proceedings. 205 Moreover, the trial judge has discretion to deny common-
law access.2 Given the validity of a properly entered protective order, the
common-law right of access will not overcome the protections of either
Rule 26(c) or similar state provisions. 2
An alternative and more novel argument for access to discovery materials
involves the presumptions inherent in both Rule 26(c) and Rule 5(d).20 8 This
presumptive right of access based on the federal rules is independent of
either the First Amendment or common-law rights of access, depending
instead on the policies embodied in the legislative scheme behind the federal
rules. 209 Rule 5(d) requires that the parties file all discovery with the district
court, absent an order to the contrary. 210 The filing requirements of Rule
203. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) (recognizing
presumption that public may inspect judicial records); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig.,
820 F.2d 352, 355 (11th Cir. 1987) (noting press and public common-law right to inspect and
copy judicial records).
204. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (recognizing common-law right of access for purpose of
keeping watch over public agencies); United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (recognizing common-law right of access as check upon public officials), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Campbell, supra
note 2, at 791 (discussing common-law right of access as outgrowth of judicial watchdog
concept). Giveh the fact that no judge is present in most cases in pretrial discovery, the
judicial watchdog concept has a very tenuous logical link to arguments for public access to
discovery. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 40 (rejecting judicial watchdog concept as having no
application in context of pretrial discovery).
205. See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting common-
law right of access to discovery); In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d 352, 355 (11th
Cir. 1987) (noting that discovery documents are not judicial records); In re Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1340, 1342 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (recognizing that
common-law right of access does not extend beyond evidence used to determine substantive
claims); Campbell, supra note 2, at 802 (arguing that even if judicial watchdog concept can
be applied to courts generally, concept cannot be applied to pretrial discovery).
206. See Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598 (recognizing court's supervisory power over its own
records and files); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933, 936 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986) (recognizing judges' discretion over common-law right of access), vacated, 730 S.W.2d
648 (Tex. 1987).
207. See Marcus, supra note 5, at 40-41 (rejecting connection between availability of
protective orders and myth that pretrial discovery is public).
208. See Campbell, supra note 2, at 806-07 (discussing statutory rights of access based
on Rules 5(d) and 26(c)).
209. See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789 (1st Cir. 1988)
(recognizing independence of federal rule access from common-law or First Amendment access),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989).
210. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(d) provides:
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon a party shall be filed with
the court either before service or within a reasonable time thereafter, but the court
may on motion of a party or on its own initiative order that depositions upon oral
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5(d) are an affirmation of the public interest in discovery materials, to
which there would be no access without Rule 5(d).21' Thus, Rule 5(d)
presumes that parties will file discovery materials, making the information
part of the public record.212 Similarly, implicit in Rule 26(c) is a presumption
of public access to discovery because absent a protective order, no limits
exist for dissemination to the public. 2 3 Thus, absent a showing of good
cause pursuant to Rule 26(c), the federal rules evince an intent to allow
public access to discovery materials.2 4 To that extent, a general public right
of access may exist independent of either the First Amendment or the
common law.2 1 Additionally, Rule 5(d), by requiring filing in the interests
of similarly situated litigants, reinforces the legitimate goals of information
sharing as a proper judicial policy.
216
The Second Circuit initially defined this statutory approach to the
presumption of public access to discovery in In re Agent Orange Product
Liability Litigation.21 7 In Agent Orange the defendant chemical companies
in a class action suit obtained an umbrella protective order allowing them
to designate discovery material as confidential. 218 On motion by the Vietnam
Veterans of America as an intervenor, the magistrate lifted the protective
orders. 219 On appeal from the district court's approval of the magistrate's
order, the Second Circuit upheld both the magistrate's action and ration-
ale.22 The Agent Orange court concluded that both Rule 26(c) and Rule
5(d) manifest a statutory intent to allow general public access to discovery
information whenever possible. 2 '
'Succeeding cases have taken varied approaches to the statutory pre-
sumption.222 In Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc.,223 the First Circuit
examination and interrogatories, requests for documents, requests for admission,
and answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on order of the court or for
use in the proceeding.
FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d).
211. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note. The advisory committee notes
to Rule 5(d) clarify that parties ordinarily must file discovery materials. Id. The rule allows a
court order exemption from filing in order to resolve expense and storage problems associated
with the filing of discovery materials. Id. The continued general requirement that parties file
discovery materials is in deference to the interests of a class, similarly situated litigants or the
public. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Bishop & Stiles, supra note 9, at 170 (discussing Agent Orange's recognition of
presumptive right of access based on Rule 26(c)).
214. See id. (describing presumptive right of access outlined in Agent Orange).
215. See id. (discussing presumptive public right of access)b
216. See FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note.
217. 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987).
218. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1987).
219. Id. at 143-44.
220. Id. at 145-47.
221. Id. at 146-47.
222. See infra notes 223-228 and accompanying text (discussing succeeding cases concerning
statutory presumptions).
223. 858 F.2d 775 (Ist Cir. 1988).
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upheld the statutory presumption over objections that upholding the statu-
tory presumption would subvert privacy and efficiency interests. 224 The
Public Citizen court reasoned that privacy and efficiency interests do not
operate independently of the federal rules, but depend on the rules as the
mechanism that protects the privacy and efficiency interests.? Thus, both
Rule 26(c) and Rule 5(d) enforce the proposition that absent good cause,
discovery must take place in the public. 226 However, not all courts share
this view.227 In rejecting the presumption, courts have cited the possibility
that general public access would undermine the discovery process.2 How-
ever, this argument ignores the fact that Rule 26(c) and its state counterparts
exist for the purpose of curbing possible abuse of discovery. "2 9
The various public access theories combined with each of the other
competing interests lay the foundation for understanding the current state
of protective orders. Because of the recent success of the plaintiff's bar in
a campaign against restrictive protective orders, 230 several legislatures have
begun placing limits on judicial use of protective orders.231 A variety of
224. Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 789-90 (Ist Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989). In Public Citizen, the First Circuit considered the validity of a
statutory presumption of public access to discovery based on Rules 26(c) and 5(d). Id. at 787-
90. The wife of a smoker who died of lung cancer sued the cigarette manufacturer. Id. at
776. The defendant obtained a protective order for documents from a consulting firm that
did research work for Liggett. Id. Public Citizen, representing a group of public health
organizations, requested modification of the order. Id. The First Circuit reasoned that Rule
5(d) created a presumption of public access to discovery documents because of the requirement
that the material be filed with the court. Id. at 788-89. Additionally, the court held that Rule
26(c) creates a presumption that discovery will take place in the public absent a showing of
good cause. Id. at 789-90. Therefore, the court ordered modification of the protective order
to allow free dissemination of discovery materials. Id. at 792.
225. Id. at 789.
226. Id. at 789.
227. See Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 504 So. 2d 378 (Fla.) (rejecting statutory
right of access based on Florida criminal and civil rule of procedure and public records law),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987). A dissent in the Florida Supreme Court noted that unfiled
discovery should be allowed the same access as filed discovery. Id. (Shaw, J., concurring and
dissenting) (arguing that because filed discovery is a public record, unfiled discovery should
be public). Likewise, Vermont rejected a presumption based on the state equivalent to Rule
5(d). See Herald Ass'n, Inc. v. Judicial Conduct Bd., 149 Vt. 233, 544 A.2d 596 (1988)
(holding that rule mandating filing of discovery does not require public access to discovery).
228. See Palm Beach, 504 So. 2d at 384 (fearing possible chilling effect on discovery).
229. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (urging courts to protect parties
from abuse in discovery by application of Rule 26(c)); C. Woi-r & A. MMLER, supra note
13, § 2036, at 267 (noting Rule 26(c)'s role as safeguard in view of broad discovery allowed
by Rule 26(b)); Campbell, supra note 2, at 778 (noting role of 26(c) as protection from harmful
side effects of liberal discovery).
230. See Wittner & Campbell, supra note 189, at 14 (discussing campaign against protective
orders in products liability litigation).
231. See infra notes 238-288 and accompanying text (discussing Texas, Virginia, and
Florida provisions and Congressional proposal); see also Lucas, Weighing the Price of Court-
Ordered Secrecy, N.J.L.J., March 14, 1991, at 3 (noting Florida, Texas and New York rules
and proposals before legislatures in New Jersey and Congress); Sullivan, In Lawsuits, How
Much Should the Courts Keep Secret, N.Y. Times, March 3, 1991, § 6, at 4, col. 1 (noting
proposals in New Jersey and Congress).
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possible mechanisms are available for legislative modification of protective
order policy.232 Legislative restrictions on protective orders have generally
taken three forms.233 The mechanism that each form employs is the distin-
guishing characteristic of each of the three forms of restriction. The first
approach, exemplified by a rule adopted by the Texas Supreme Court,
rejects the good cause standard in favor of a more stringent standard that
requires a showing of a specific, serious, and substantial interest before a
court can issue a protective order.234 A second approach, exemplified by a
Virginia statute and a Congressional proposal, adopts information sharing
as a legitimate and desirable use of discovery.2?5 Finally, the third approach,
as crafted by the Florida legislature, issues a flat prohibition against pro-
tective orders when discovery implicates the public welfare. 636 Although
balancing similar considerations, each approach has different goals and
different effects. Evaluating each approach in terms of the balance achieved
between defendant, plaintiff, and public interests reveals that only the second
approach, information sharing, properly protects every interested party.
7
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a (Rule 76a) is essentially a redefinition
of the applicable standard and a clarification of the balancing test in
protective order analysis.28 Texas Rule 166b(5) originally governed protective
232. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 369-75 (discussing mechanisms of balancing test,
specific exceptions, modification of court discretion, and increased advocacy). An alternative
mechanism for legislative changes to protective order policy to those discussed infra includes
fashioning a rule modeled on the Freedom of Information Act, allowing nonparties to request
access to discovery information held by the courts. Id. at 373. The alternative mechanism
would require disclosure absent a specified exception. See Freedom of Information Reform
Act of 1986, 5 U.S.C. § 552. Courts have generally rejected the application of the FOIA to
the courts. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir.
1983) (rejecting FOIA), cert. denied 465 U.S. 110 (1984).
233. See infra notes 234-236 and accompanying text (discussing types of legislative res-
trictions on protective orders).
234. See infra notes 238-258 and accompanying text (discussing Texas Rule 76a). A
proposal in the Illinois legislature in 1991, the Sunshine Litigation Bill, is similar to the Texas
rule, in that both would require that sealing can only occur on a showing of a specific, serious
and substantial interest that outweighs the probable effect on the public. See Blum & Samborn,
Tylenol Settlement Revives Secrecy War, Nat'l L.J., May 27, 1991, at 3 (describing Illinois
proposal).
235. See infra notes 259-283 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia provision and
Congressional proposal).
236. See infra notes 284-288 and accompanying text (discussing Florida Sunshine in
Litigation Act).
237. See supra notes 115-139 and accompanying text (adopting information sharing as
most effective mechanism).
238. Texas Rule 76a provides in pertinent part:
1. Standard for Sealing Court Records. Court records may not be removed from
court files except as permitted by statute or rule. No court order or opinion issued
in the adjudication of a case may be sealed. Other court records, as defined in this
rule, are presumed to be open to the general public and may be sealed only upon
a showing of all of the following:
(a) a specific, serious and substantial interest which clearly outweighs:
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orders, using the good cause standard. 239 Rule 166b(5)(c) now requires that
a protective order for discovery accord with Rule 76a.m Rule 76a first
formalizes a presumption of openness to the general public of all court
records.24 The balancing test then requires the party requesting the protective
order to show a specific, serious, and substantial interest that clearly
outweighs the presumption of openness and the risk of harm to public
health or safety.u 2 Once the party overcomes the presumption, however,
Rule 76a still requires the moving party to show that the protective order
is the least restrictive means of protection available.2 43 The standard-
specific, serious, and substantial interest-is a more difficult standard to
meet than the good cause standard that the federal rule and the majority
of state rules embody2 44 Moreover, no specific exception for trade secrets
exists in the Texas rule; thus, the competitive harm of trade secret disclosure
(1) this presumption of openness;
(2) any probably adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general public health
or safety;
(b) no less restrictive means than sealing records will adequately and effectively
protect the specific interest asserted.
Tax. R. Crv. P. 76a (1991). The Supreme Court drafted the new rule in response to a state
legislative mandate. See Doggett, Keeping Court Records in the Open, TwmL, July, 1990, at
62 (describing Rule 76a's background); TEx. CODE ANN. § 22.010 (1989) (directing Texas
Supreme Court to consider problem of sealing court records).
239. See TEx. R. C-v. P. 166b(5)(c) (applying good cause standard to orders sealing
discovery). The current form of the rule retains the good cause terminology, but adds the
requirement that any protective order conform to Rule 76(a). See infra note 240 (quoting Rule
166b(5)).
240. Tax. R. Crv. P. 166b(S). Rule 166b(5) provides:
On motion specifying the grounds and made by any person against or from whom
discovery is sought under these rules, the court may make any order in the interest
of justice necessary to protect the movant from undue burden, unnecessary expense,
harassment or annoyance, or invasion of personal, constitutional, or property
rights....
Specifically, the court's authority as to such orders extends to, although it is not
necessarily limited by, any of the following:
a. ordering that requested discovery not be sought in whole or in part, or that the
extent or subject matter of discovery be limited, or that it not be undertaken at the
time or place specified.
b. ordering that the discovery be undertaken only by such method or upon such
terms and conditions or at the time and place directed by the court.
c. ordering that for good cause shown results of discovery be sealed or otherwise
adequately protected, that its distribution be limited, or that its disclosure be
restricted. Any order under this subparagraph 5(c) shall be made in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 76a with respect to all court records subject to that rule.
TEx. R. C v. P. 166b(5) (1991).
241. See supra note 238 (quoting Rule 76a).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Doggett, supra note 238, at 63 (describing standard embodied in Rule 76a).
Justice Doggett, one of the proponents of Rule 76a, noted that instances in which records
should be sealed should be rare. Id.
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must be subjected to the balancing test of Rule 76a.24s The new rule manifests
a concern in Texas that corporate abuse of the protective order provision
was overshadowing the interest in public welfare. Because of Rule 76a's
focus on additional procedures and a multi-step analysis, the Texas rule is
the clearest articulation of the perceived imbalance in current protective
order practice. 247
Unfortunately, the fact that the Texas Supreme Court recognizes an
imbalance does not necessarily mean that Rule 76a resolves the problem.2
The greatest concern with Rule 76a is with the procedures that the Rule
provides. 249 Rule 76a provides for public notice and a public hearing on
any protective order motion.250 Further, anyone can intervene in the hear-
ing.25' Potentially, application of the rule will cause increased pretrial
motions and hearings, as well as heightened expense as defendants resist
discovery more aggressively. 2 z Moreover, because the terms of 76a include
settlement agreements, critics fear a chilling effect on the Texas public
245. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a (weighing risk to public, presumption of openness, and
defendant's interest). The rule does contain an exception for discovery in cases initiated for
trade-secret infringement. Id. The trade secret infringement exception is not available in
products liability litigation. Id. See also Doggett, supra note 228, at 63 (noting exception for
discovery in cases originally initiated for trade-secret infringement). The advisory committee
that produced Rule 76a was composed of plaintiff's lawyers, who would be naturally adverse
to the trade secret exception. See Tex. Law., Feb. 26, 1990, at 4 (quoting subcommittee co-
chair Charles Herring as saying that plaintiff's lawyers view trade secret exceptions as used to
seal files too frequently).
246. See Wash. Post, April 21, 1990, at A2 (quoting Texas Supreme Court Justice Doggett
as concerned about abuse of protective orders to detriment of public welfare).
247. See Doggett, supra note 238, at 63 (characterizing Rule 76a as attempt to balance
interests according to specified standards).
248. See infra notes 249-257 and accompanying text (discussing disadvantages of Texas
Rule 76a); see also Doggett, supra note 238, at 64 (describing Rule 76a as an initial attempt
to correct balance).
249. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 76a (defining procedural aspects of protective order requests).
The procedures required by 76a include notice of a motion to seal records and a hearing in
open court in which any party may intervene and participate. Id. Additionally, the court
retains continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order, and any person who had no




252. See TEx. R. Crv. P. 76a, concurring and dissenting statement by Justice Gonzalez
and Justice Hecht (stating concern that hearings will overburden courts and prevent final
decisions from being entered); Chamberlain, Proposed Rule 76a: An Elaborate, Time-Consum-
ing, Cumbersome Procedure, TEx. BAR 3., April, 1990, at 349 (discussing possibility of
additional court burdens); Peterson, Proposed Rule 76a: A Radical Turning Point for Trade
Secrets, Tax. BAR J., April, 1990, at 345 (noting probability of delay and "mini-trials" in
litigation). Both authors considered an older version of the proposed rule, which included a
much stricter "compelling need" standard, as well as an addition to rule 166b(5) which would
block protective orders which conceal public health information. See TEx. BAR J., April, 1990,
at 338-39 (describing original compelling need standard). The procedures commented upon,
however, are substantially unchanged. Id. See generally Texas Lawyer, May 21, 1990, at 24
(predicting higher litigation costs and strained dockets).
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interest in settlement as the parties are forced to reveal settlement terms.253
Further, the new standard may be too vague to guide litigants and courts.
4
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the rule is the lack of any privilege
for legitimate trade secrets or potentially damaging competitive informa-
tion . 5 The benefits of Garcia,256 protecting the defendant's information
while allowing collaboration among plaintiffs, will be lost whenever the
public welfare is implicated. 257
While Texas concentrated on the public welfare interest, Virginia di-
rected its efforts towards information sharing.25s In 1989, the Virginia
legislature revised Virginia code section 8.01-420.01 to allow information
sharing among plaintiffs attorneys involved in similar litigation. 259 The
253. See Chamberlain, supra note 252, at 349 (discussing Rule 76a's chilling effect on
settlements); Plaintiffs' Counsel Win New Texas Supreme Court Rule, DEFENSE CoUNSEL J.,
July, 1990, at 280 (same).
254. See Tex. Law., May 21, 1990, at 24 (calling the standard a "non-standard" that
fails to achieve its goals of compromise between interests).
The standard embodied in Rule 76a is in one sense a step backwards, as it is extremely
similar to the standard described by the D.C. Circuit in the pre-Seattle Times case, In re
Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In holding that the basis for a protective order was
deficient, the court noted that a proper protective order must meet each of three criteria. Id.
at 191. The harm posed by dissemination must be substantial and serious, the restraining order
must be narrowly drawn and precise, and there must be no less restrictive alternative means
of protecting the public interest. Id. In comparison, Texas Rule 76a requires a showing of a
specific, serious and substantial interest which outweighs the presumption of openness and the
effect on public safety. TEx. R. Crv. P. 76a(l)(a). Moreover, the Texas rule requires that
courts find that no less restrictive means than the protective order will protect the interest
involved. Id. The Halkin court's language concerning a narrow and precise order refers to the
court's insistence on a particular and specific demonstration of fact. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 193.
Thus, where Halkin requires a specific demonstration of serious and substantial harm, id. at
191, Rule 76a requires a demonstration of a specific, serious and substantial interest, Tax. R.
Civ. P. 76a, and both require a least restrictive means analysis. Tax. R. Civ. P. 76a; Halkin,
598 F.2d at 195.
255. See supra note 245 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of trade secret
exception); Wash. Post, April 21, 1990, at A2 (noting concerns of industry groups that lack
of trade secret exclusion will cause competitive disadvantage and protracted litigation).
256. See supra notes 124-135 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia and benefits of
information sharing).
257. See Tax. R. Civ. P. 76a (specifically valuing risk to public); Wash. Post, April 21,
1990, at A2 (noting Texas Supreme Court's effort to prevent limited public access to product
information); supra note 47-81 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's need for trade
secret protection).
258. See infra notes 259-277 (discussing Virginia statute).
259. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (1990). The statute provides in pertinent part:
A protective order issued to prevent disclosure of materials or information related
to a personal injury action or action for wrongful death produced in discovery in
any cause shall not prohibit an attorney from voluntarily sharing such materials or
information with an attorney involved in a similar or related matter, with the
permission of the court, after notice and an opportunity to be heard to any party
or person protected by the protective order, and provided the attorney who receives
the material or information agrees, in writing, to be bound by the terms of the
protective order.
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court's authority to grant protective orders is found in rule 4:1(c), which is
identical to Federal Rule 26(c). 20 A concern for public safety prompted a
legislative response concerning protective orders. 261 Section 8.01-420.01 pro-
hibits any protective order from blocking information sharing among attor-
neys involved in similar litigation, conditioned upon the parties involved in
the collateral litigation agreeing to be bound by the order.2 62 Procedurally,
the Virginia statute requires permission of the court to share information
with other attorneys, with notice and an opportunity to be heard for the
protected party.263 Because the statute essentially limits the court's discretion
under rule 4:1(c), Virginia continues to provide specifically for trade secret
protection, with the proviso that the court must allow dissemination to
similarly situated plaintiffs.264
The advantages of the Virginia statute include the verification, cost-
cutting, and efficiency advantages of information sharing generally.2 65 How-
ever, the statute does not guarantee the expected benefits to public welfare,
because the section makes no provision for information sharing with gov-
ernment regulators.2 Because the Virginia statute retains the Rule 26(c)-
type protective order, courts may still consider public safety as a counter-
vailing interest. 267 As with other protective order provisions, supporters
claim that the new rule will eliminate duplicitous discovery, substantially
decreasing litigation costs.26s Conversely, manufacturers claim discovery costs
would escalate due to more resistance in discovery, an argument that ignores
the fact that protective orders are not designed as enforcement mechanisms
for proper discovery practices. 269 Additionally, information sharing would
encourage voluntary compliance because plaintiffs will be able to recognize
inconsistencies in discovery responses between different cases.
One difficulty with the Virginia approach is that a large amount of the
shared information may be irrelevant to the other plaintiffs case, which
260. See VA. R. Sup. CT. 4:1(c) (adopting language identical to Rule 26(c)).
261. See Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1989, at B5 (noting that although measure does not allow
sharing information with public, revision would increase likelihood of safety information
reaching regulators and public trial).
262. See supra note 259 (quoting langugage of § 8.01-420.01).
263. Id.
264. See id. (quoting language of § 8.01-420.01). Because the Virginia protective order
rule, Rule 4:1(c), mirrors Rule 26(c), both rules have the same scope, including trade secret
and confidential information exceptions. See VA. R. Sup. Cr. 4:1(c) (giving protection to trade
secrets and confidential information).
265. See supra notes 115-139 (discussing advantages of information sharing); see also
Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1989, at D3 (noting verification advantages).
266. See Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1989, at D3 (noting that government safety regulators
routinely do not see documents).
267. See supra note 180 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of public welfare
as overriding interest).
268. See Wash. Post, Feb. 22, 1989, at B5 (discussing possible advantages of Virginia
statute).
269. See id. (noting fears that Virginia statute will cause more aggressive discovery




calls into doubt the efficiency of information sharing. 270 At the very least,
however, the plaintiff involved in collateral litigation avoids the time and
expense of discovery for much of the information. Moreover, the second
plaintiff can use the discovery to verify compliance with his own discovery
requests.271 A more serious concern is that, while subsequent attorneys could
receive the discovery information, a protective order could block actual use
of the shared materials in subsequent litigation.272 In response, the plaintiff
could either challenge the protective order27 3 or, more simply, make his own
discovery request of the defendant. At the very least, information sharing
would let the plaintiff know about the discovery material while the prior
system made no such guarantee. 274 The Virginia legislature, by adopting
information sharing as a discovery mechanism, continues to protect trade
secrets and confidential information as a proper balance requires. 275 The
Virginia statute has eliminated the shortcomings of the original rule 26(c)-
type protective order policy by the use of a mechanism that gives a legitimate
value to the goals of trade secret protection, judicial efficiency, and public
safety.276 With the minor revision of allowing exchange with government
regulators, the Virginia provision serves as a model for the proper balance
of competing interests. 2"
Similar to -the Virginia statute, Congressional bill H.R. 129 prohibits
protective orders that would prevent information sharing among attorney
involved in similar litigation. 27 Like the Virginia statute, the Congressional
270. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 372 (noting that much information relevant to one
case may have nothing to do with another).
271. See Wash. Post, Feb. 6, 1989, at D3 (noting verification advntages).
272. See Thomas, supra note 2, at 372 (noting that use of the information by similarly
situated plaintiff still will be limited by protective order).
273. See id. (discussing difficulties involved with Virginia statute). As a non-party to the
original litigation, a similarly-situated plaintiff in a jurisdiction with a Rule 26(c)-type protective
order provision may not have standing to challenge the order. Id.
274. See id. (noting viability of statute as means to allow plaintiff to verify discovered
information or for fashioning new discovery requests).
275. See Note, A Proposal, supra note 34, at 1149 (finding that information sharing
would protect defendant's interest in trade secrets and confidential information).
276. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (1989) (applying information sharing mechanism).
277. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (1989) (allowing information sharing among
attorneys) with H.R. 129 (1989) (prohibiting court from entering protective order which prevents
information sharing among attorneys involved in similar litigation and regulatory agencies).
278. H.R. 129 states:
No court may enter an order in a product liability action involving a product
distributed in commerce that forbids any person from making any document or
other information which is obtained in discovery and which is reasonably related to
design specification, performance standards, warranties, warnings and instructions,
or any other matter related to the safety of any product distributed in commerce
available to-
(1) a Federal, State, or local regulatory agency, law enforcement agency, or legislative
or judicial body if the agency or body has regulatory, law enforcement, legislative,
or adjudicative responsibility with respect to the product and if the agency or body
states in writing to such person before such document or information is made
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bill acts as an amendment to Rule 26(c). However, the Congressional version
of information sharing also allows attorneys to make the information
available to regulatory bodies. 2 9 The provision allowing information sharing
is triggered, however, only when the information is related to the safety of
the product2 0 Because of the limited scope, H.R. 129 loses much of the
benefit of information sharing; plaintiffs still will need to duplicate discovery
in similar cases except for discovery information relating to safety.2S' The
one glaring shortcoming of the bill is that no provision is made to bind the
other attorneys to the terms of the protective order.?2 Once one attorney
discloses the information to another attorney, the protective order no longer
controls dissemination.2 3 Thus, the bill succeeds in achieving the limited
objective of information sharing, but fails either to protect the defendant's
interest in the process or to recognize the substantial benefits of the
mechanism employed.
The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act (Sunshine Act), at the other
extreme from the Congressional bill, takes an absolute approach towards
public safety by prohibiting any court from entering an order which conceals
a public hazard.2" The statute exempts trade secrets from-disclosure only
available that it has procedures in place to prevent the unauthorized disclosure to
the public of trade secret information, or
(2) any person who the person reasonably believes-
(A) is an attorney duly licensed to practice law in a State or the District of Columbia,
and
(B) is representing a person with a product liability claim which involves a product
of the same type, brand or model involved in the product liability action of the
person furnishing the document or information, for use in connection with a product
liability claim.
H.R. 129, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
279. See H.R. 129 § l(a)(1) (allowing dissemination of discovery material to federal, state
or local regulatory agencies, law enforcement agencies, or legislative or judicial bodies with
regulatory or law enforcement responsibility with respect to product).
280. See id. at § l(a) (stating that courts may not enter protective orders in products
liability actions dealing with safety of product).
281. Compare H.R. 129 (limiting applicability to information related to safety of product)
with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (limiting applicability to information related to action).
The Texas rule is even more expansive, limited only to court records, which the Texas rules
define broadly. Tax. R. Civ. P. 76a.
282. Compare H.R. 129 (lacking requirement that protective order bind attorneys in
collateral litigation) with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (requiring that protective order bind
attorney in collateral litigation).
283. See H.R. 129 (lacking requirement that protective order bind attorney in collateral
litigation).
284. The Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act provides:
(3) Except pursuant to this section, no court shall enter an order or judgment which
has the purpose or effect of concealing a public hazard or any information concerning
a public hazard, nor shall the court enter an order or judgment which has the
purpose or effect of concealing any information which may be useful to members
of the public in protecting themselves from injury which may result from the public
hazard.
(4) Any portion of an agreement or contract which has the purpose or effect of
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if the information is not pertinent to public safety.215 Essentially, the
Sunshine Act destroys the balancing test by making one concern, public
safety, paramount and overriding. 286 Once the court finds a public hazard,
the court loses all discretion to fashion a protective order. 287 Although the
Sunshine Act implicitly allows information sharing, 218 the mechanism is
meaningless without the protection provided to manufacturers. Further,
because the statute only applies to public hazards, protective orders presum-
ably will continue to block information sharing for non-hazardous infor-
mation that the manufacturer claims to be confidential. The Sunshine Act
makes an effective mechanism ineffective by reducing the protection for
legitimate defendant interests and not going far enough in attempting to
aid subsequent litigants. Instead, the balance is skewed in favor of the
public without regard to the interests of the parties to the litigation.
The shortcomings and strengths of each of the provisions are best
illustrated by applying each provision to a hypothetical set of facts. As a
hypothetical, the facts from Garcia v. Peeples 9 are instructive. In Garcia
the plaintiff's vehicle burst into flames when another car hit Garcia's from
behind.2" The plaintiff claimed that a design defect in the fuel system
caused a fire that was fed by fuel from the gas tank. 29' The manufacturer,
General Motors Corporation, moved for a protective order for documents
containing trade secrets relating to the fuel system design.292 The application
of Rule 26(c) mirrors the result reached by the lower court, which issued
an umbrella order absolutely restricting dissemination. 293
Viewed within the context of the hypothetical facts, the Texas rule
would require that the harm resulting from the loss of trade secrets be
concealing a public hazard, any information concerning a public hazard, or any
information which may be useful to members of the public in protecting themselves
from injury which may result from the public hazard, is void, contrary to public
policy and may not be enforced.
(5) Trade secrets as defined in § 688.002 which are not pertinent to public hazards
shall be protected pursuant to chapter 688.
FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (1990).
285. Id.
286. See Business Ins., June 25, 1990, at 21 (stating that availability of information will
protect public and improve compensation to victims).
287. See FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (making public safety paramount concern).
288. See id. (noting that information may be used in related proceedings).
289. 734 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1987). Facts similar to Garcia may be found in Parsons v.
General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980) and Ward v. Ford Motor Co., 93
F.R.D. 579 (D. Colo. 1982).
290. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 344 (rex. 1987).
291. Id.
292. Id. In Garcia, the trial court entered an umbrella or blanket protective order to
cover the documents relating to fuel system integrity. Id. The Supreme Court of Texas, on
mandamus, held that although trade secrets were involved, the protective order was too broad,
as it restricted information sharing among plaintiffs involved in similar suits. Id. at 348.
293. Id. at 344-45. The Texas Supreme Court reached a different result than the lower
courts only because the supreme court began to mandate information sharing in protective
orders. See id. (mandating information sharing as part of protective order procedure).
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greater than both the presumption of openness and the interest in public
health or safety. 214 Although a court could, in its discretion, find that the
competitive harm would overcome the presumption of openness, the adverse
effect to the general public welfare of not disclosing the defects of the fuel
integrity system probably would tip the balance in favor of denying the
motion for protective order. 295 A possible compromise could occur if the
court estimated that the risk of public harm was slight in comparison to
the risk of competitive harm to the company, in which case the court could
allow the protective order. 29 The least restrictive means policy embodied in
the new rule would suggest that the protective order would have to allow
information sharing among plaintiffs. 29 However, Garcia directs Texas
courts to allow information sharing for any protective order, obviating the
need for a similar interpretation of Rule 76a.298 Given the stricter standard
and the clear intent behind Rule 76a to limit use of protective orders if
public safety is concerned, 29 the most probable outcome is denial of the
protective order.3°° In this instance, the Texas rule protects the public
interest, but the effect on the defendant's interest could be devastating
competitively. The existence of Garcia as a mandate for information sharing
makes the need for the Texas rule with stricter standards tenuous in light
of the possible damage to defendants.
Both the Virginia statute and the Congressional bill would impose
essentially the same order that the appeals court in Garcia imposed. 0 Thus,
attorneys would be able to exchange information, creating an expanded
class of persons subject to the order. °2 The information sharing mechanism
would reduce litigation costs and delay. Moreover, public awareness of the
defect could come by virtue of a public trial, without requiring public
disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information. Where the advantages
of the Texas rule stem from the pre-existing mechanism of information
sharing, Virginia has adopted information sharing as the primary mecha-
nism. 303 With the minor revision to the Virginia bill of allowing disclosure
294. See supra notes 240-245 and accompanying text (discussing Texas procedure pursuant
to Rule 76a).
295. See Doggett, supra note 238, at 63 (noting Texas rule's perspective that public interest
is important factor in protective order analysis). Doggett notes that the public interest may be
overcome when the possibility of harm to the public is minimal and the private interest is
great. Id.
296. See id. (discussing possibility of private order if public interest is minimal).
297. See TEx. R. Crv. P. 76a(l)(b) (enunciating least restrictive means policy).
298. See Doggett, supra note 238, at 63 (stating that even when need for protection is
established, information sharing will be required).
299. See id. (discussing public welfare interest in Rule 76a analysis).
300. See id. (noting that instances in which sealing will be required should be rare).
301. See supra notes 124-134 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia v. Peeples).
302. Id.
303. See VA. STAT. § 8.01-420.01 (allowing information sharing). Under the precedent of
Garcia v. Peeples, Texas courts are generally required to allow information sharing under the
restrictions of any protective order. See American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Dibrell, 736
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to government agents and requiring compliance with the protective order
for all plaintiffs to whom information is disseminated, the Virginia statute
serves as a model provision which protects all relevant interests. The ability
to disseminate information to other plaintiffs would protect plaintiff interests
by decreasing overall litigation costs. Defendant interests continue to be
preserved by a protective order which limits dissemination. Finally, the
public is protected from hazards by operation of information sharing with
government regulators and by the exchange of information among plaintiffs'
attorneys.
The Florida rule goes to the opposite extreme, preventing a court from
entering a protective order to conceal the trade secrets or to allow infor-
mation sharing alone, as the Garcia court did. 3°4 Although a legitimate trade
secret existed, because the documents contained information pertinent to a
public hazard the court would be required to allow full access to discovery.
Because most products cases involve potential public hazards, protective
orders should become extremely rare in Florida product liability litigation.
The competitive value of the defendant's information will become meaning-
less if disclosure to the public is required in every case.
Given the legitimate needs of each of the three interests involved in
products litigation, only information sharing provides a stable balance. As
a mechanism, information sharing avoids duplicitous discovery while main-
taining the secrecy required for the defendant's competitive interests. Ad-
ditionally, information sharing protects the public by allowing a limited
right to disseminate information that is relevant to public welfare. In striking
the correct balance, the principles embodied in Garcia and the policy behind
the Virginia statute achieve a mutually advantageous and equitable measure
of competing interests.
DAv-D Tnnmns
S.W.2d 257 (Tx. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that Garcia requires trial court to allow information
sharing); Doggett, supra note 238, at 63 (noting requirement that Texas courts follow precedent
of Garcia).
304. See supra notes 124-134 and accompanying text (discussing Garcia v. Peeples).
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